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	<title>Writers Of History</title>
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	<description>Teaching The Art Of Historic Method</description>
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		<title>Gnosis:  Spiritual Search Of The Ancient World</title>
		<link>http://writersofhistory.com/?p=78</link>
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		<pubDate>Thu, 02 Sep 2010 01:55:11 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Donald Baker</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Ancient History]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://writersofhistory.com/?p=78</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<!-- cincopa_excerpt_rt = 'full' --><p>New Testament scholarship has long sought to recount the religious situation in Corinth as addressed by the Apostle Paul in his letters to the Corinthians.  The most tantalizing question is whether or not the Corinthians were Gnostics, proto-gnostics, or something related to Jewish Hellenism.  It is now certain that the Corinthians definitely were not Gnostics like Valentinus, Basilides, or Marcion of the second and third centuries.  However, many scholars are still maintaining that the Corinthians were proto-gnostics or the forerunners of Gnosticism; possibly influenced by the Jewish Hellenistic school located in Alexandria.  This paper shall attempt to show the true nature behind the uses of sophia (wisdom) and gnosis (knowledge) in the Pauline corpus as innocent references to secular wisdom in general; not just an exclusive avenue of Hellenistic thought.  Furthermore, we shall investigate the extent of Jewish influences, namely that of Philo and the possible link with Apollos of Alexandria.  It is hoped that through a historical, geographical, and exegetical approach; a more clear understanding of the Corinthian religious situation, as a random phenomenon of Roman environmental circumstances, can be established.</p>
<p><strong>I  The Spiritual Search of the Pagan World</strong></p>
<p>The world of Paul and the Corinthians was a period of spiritual, political, and<br />
cultural fluctuation.  Ideas were moving freely across the Empire thanks to a Roman policy of tolerance.  This process set the stage for Christianity as eloquently stated by Starr:</p>
<blockquote><p>A major element in the spread of Christianity was the fact that the pagan world<br />
was already moving, though blindly, in the direction that Christian thought<br />
was to take more consciously.  Neither a Roman poet like Virgil nor a<br />
Greek philosopher like Epictetus would have understood the statement that<br />
he was a forerunner of Christianity, yet it is true that many thinkers and<br />
artists of the Empire reflect the contemporary spiritual uneasiness and<br />
the search for meaning in a vast, materialistic world.<strong>1</strong></p></blockquote>
<p>Starr&#8217;s comments are not only an accurate assessment, but they also hint as to what was going on at Corinth.  The Corinthians were experiencing new ideas (Christianity being the primary item), but the residue of old ideas may have not been entirely effaced from the Corinthian minds.  We shall come back to this very important point later on in our investigation.</p>
<p>As we have just seen, the whole drive of imperial culture was in the direction of new concepts <strong>2</strong> of man and of the divine.<strong>3</strong> Roman hegemony tended to alienate the people across the Empire; causing them to seek after things pertaining to identity, purpose, and security.  Roman authority, being supreme and supra-national, meant exile in one&#8217;s own country; therefore, religion and philosophy became outlets for unsatisfied faith and lost pride&#8211;otherwise filled by the love of one&#8217;s nation.  Quite simply, the Roman age was a time not only of uncontrolled blood lust, but of pessimism and nerve failure regarding the powers of man to work out his own future.<strong>4</strong> This was a world dominated by Fortune, Fate, and daemons.<strong>5</strong> It is no wonder that the Corinthians were looking for something substantive (gnosis) here and now, rather than waiting for the return of Christ or undergoing a process of sanctification.  Salvivic knowledge of any kind was desperately sought.</p>
<p>Where did one find such knowledge?  The choices were limitless and all vying for the attention of anyone interested.  During this time, we find a significant respect for oracles, miracle-workers, and a host of emotional, personal mystery faiths.<strong>6</strong> From Egypt came the Hellenized cult of Isis the mother of all, from Persia came Mithras with its Babylonian astrology, Cybele (the Great Mother) was worshipped since 204 B.C., and of course Rome introduced emperor worship to accompany the old pantheon of gods of Classical Greece.<strong>7</strong></p>
<p>Religion was not the only way to fill the spiritual void.  Philosophy was yet another option available to the first century seeker of truth and knowledge.  It offered more immediate results than a promise of the after-life.  Some philosophic schools were interested in a way of living more than salvation.  Epicureans and Stoics were examples of this.  They offered a code of conduct rather than a faith.  Epicureans preached contentment through a pursuit of non-excessive pleasures.  Stoics emphasized the acceptance of being only an insignificant part of the cosmos where all one must do is simply fulfill the role nature has assigned.  Seneca sums it up nicely:</p>
<blockquote><p>Our motto, as everyone knows, is to live in conformity with nature:  it is<br />
quite contrary to nature to torture one&#8217;s body, to reject simple standards<br />
of cleanliness and make a point of being dirty, to adopt a diet that is not<br />
just plain but hideous and revolting&#8230;  Philosophy calls for simple living, not<br />
for doing penance, and the simple way of life need not be a crude one.<strong>8</strong></p></blockquote>
<p>Seneca&#8217;s call for a simple and realistic life is a practical approach in an age of anxiety filled with so many pathways to heaven.  Seneca&#8217;s dry remark on penance is just one example felt by many  that religion can be a torture which thwarts happiness in the present world.  The mentality is:  &#8220;why must we wait for heaven to come down to us, or us to ascend to heaven, when we can live out our salvation now?&#8221;  No doubt Paul deals with a similar mentality in Corinth.<br />
The brief sketch of the Roman world is necessary for our argument because it explains to us that nature of the surroundings Paul had to work within.  But what about Corinth itself?  Raymond Brown, in his commentary, reminds us that the Corinth Paul visited was not continuous with the ancient city that was destroyed by the Roman consul, Lucius Mummius in 146 B.C.<strong>9</strong> Julius Caesar began its restoration in 44 B.C., enticing Jews, Greeks, Romans, and Orientals to gravitate to the city because it was a mighty commercial sea port ranking with Alexandria, Ephesus, and Rome itself as one of the most important cities in the Empire.<strong>10</strong> Corinth was thus a melting pot of cultures that mixed their ideas as well as their commerce.</p>
<p>It is highly probable that Gnostic ideas from Alexandria made their way across the Mediterranean to Corinth as a by-product of commercial trade, but does Paul necessarily deal with it in his letters to the Corinthians?  Rudolph Bultmann thought Gnosticism crept into Corinth via Alexandria and its Hellenistic Jewish contingency through a syncretistic process, as did Schmithals and Wilckens who found a Gnostic Christology among the opponents of Paul in 1 Corinthians.<strong>11</strong> Brown, however, correctly states that gnosticizing tendencies are not sufficient to substantiate a developed system or theology&#8211;furthermore, Corinth as a melting pot, would never have been an ideal place for one to develop.<strong>12</strong> Of course, we still have to deal with the lingering scholarly consensus that they were proto-gnostics influenced by Alexandrian Jewish Hellenism, but we must first turn our attention to Paul before we can.</p>
<p>Now that we have discounted the possibility of an organized Gnostic &#8220;system&#8221; at Corinth, let us recount Paul and his visit to the city.  We know from the Acts of the Apostles that Paul came to Corinth after his missionary venture in Athens (18:1 NKJV).  He met Aquila and Priscilla, Jews who had recently arrived in Corinth because of the expulsion from Rome ordered by Claudius (18:2).  Acts also tells us that Paul was in Corinth during the proconsulship of Gallio (18:12).  Hans Conzelmann dates Gallio&#8217;s proconsulship between 51 A.D. to as late as 53 A.D.<strong>13</strong> Paul, therefore, remained in Corinth sometime during these years&#8211;a lengthy enough time for the Corinthians to fully understand his teachings.  Paul stayed on this long as the founder of a new church, probably organizing leaders and teaching them so that they could continue on without him for it is likely he knew he would be moving on.  Paul&#8217;s lengthy stay is important because, even in spite of it, the Corinthians deviate from his teachings soon after he leaves.  Many scholars believe that Jewish Hellenism from Alexandria moved into the Corinthian church at this time; possibly derived from the Jewish writer Philo.</p>
<p>In Alexandria arose the greatest Jewish scholar of the Diaspora, Philo (c. 30 B.C.&#8211;45 A.D.), who essayed to reconcile Plato and the Bible, while giving priority in invention to Moses, and developed an allegorical method of interpreting the Old Testament for that purpose.<strong>14</strong> In Philo&#8217;s writings, he shows a profound personal intimacy with the heavenly Sophia (feminine personification of wisdom).<strong>15 </strong> Lady Wisdom or Sophia is the central character of Hellenistic Jewish wisdom literature.  She has been a literary figure used even in the Bible.<strong>16</strong> Richard Horsley maintains that it is this view that the Corinthians have in mind with their usage of sophia in 1 Corinthians 1-4.<strong>17 </strong> Of course we have to remember that it is Paul who writes the term, and not the Corinthians; therefore, we must understand his usage of it.  But for Philo, Sophia was the giver of wisdom and knowledge (gnosis), usually &#8220;knowledge of God&#8221; or &#8220;knowledge of truth.&#8221;<strong>18 </strong> Gnosis thus becomes the religious theological content of sophia; an expression or one manifestation of it.<strong>19 </strong> The recipients thereby have a special religious status, as &#8220;wise&#8221; or &#8220;righteous&#8221; or &#8220;perfect.&#8221;<strong>20</strong> Since it is through Paul&#8217;s context we must proceed, let us look briefly at the literary characteristics of 1 Corinthians.  By analyzing the structure of 1 Corinthians, we can better understand who and what Paul is addressing, and whether or not Jewish Hellenism is the culprit of the ideas he is attacking.   <span id="more-78"></span></p>
<p><strong>II  Literary Form, Terminology, and the Role of Apollos in 1 Corinthians</strong></p>
<p>Adolf Deissmann defined the epistle as an &#8220;artistic letter&#8221; or a piece of literature, while a letter would be more of an &#8220;experience&#8221; and &#8220;artless.&#8221;<strong>21</strong> Doty adds to this the Artemonian definition of epistles as &#8220;half of a dialogue&#8221; or a &#8220;dialogue halved.&#8221;<strong>22</strong> 1 Corinthians is most definitely a dialogue halved since Paul directly addresses the Corinthians (as like in a discussion) in (2:3)&#8211;&#8221;I was with you in weakness&#8230;&#8221;  Paul also asks direct conversational questions:  &#8220;Where is the wise?&#8221; (1:20), &#8220;For who makes you differ from another?&#8221; (4:7).  Paul asks these questions as if it were his own fault that the Corinthians had gone astray.  One must remember Paul spent the greater part of two years teaching the Corinthians; it is highly possible that he felt they misunderstood him, and wanted to be aware of any others who might have confused them.</p>
<p>This last point brings us to the fact that in 1 Corinthians, Paul makes us aware of four factions (1:11-12)<strong>23</strong> in the Corinthian church&#8211;which should not surprise us since Corinth was a major commercial sea port where cultures and ideas mixed and often clashed together.  This is very important because it is these four factions that Paul is addressing throughout the letter.  It stands to reason that they disagreed on their theology, therefore, Paul&#8217;s use of sophia and gnosis are general terms that are both applicable and interchangeable for all of the factions.<strong>24</strong></p>
<p>Upon this last conclusion, let us look at some examples of how Paul uses sophia and gnosis in chapters 1-4 of 1 Corinthians.   Paul says in (1:5), &#8220;&#8230;that you were enriched in every thing by Him in all utterance and knowledge (gnosis)&#8230;  This statement comes from the thanksgiving section of the epistle where Paul thanks God for the revelational gnosis He has imparted upon the Corinthian church.  Gnosis in this sense is positive as &#8220;knowledge of God.&#8221;  It is significant to notice that Paul is crediting the Corinthians with some religious knowledge, but he still labels them &#8220;carnal&#8221; (3:3) which forces him to still give them spiritual &#8220;milk&#8221; rather than &#8220;solid food&#8221; (3:2).  It is because of the existence of divisions (factions) that they are carnal&#8211;&#8221;behaving like mere men&#8221; (3:3).</p>
<p>Now Paul shifts gears in chapter 8 when he begins a discussion on things sacrificed to idols.  He makes the statement:  &#8220;We know that we all have gnosis&#8221; (8:1).  Paul hear is commenting on how every Christian knows that &#8220;an idol is nothing in the world,&#8221; and &#8220;there is no other God but one&#8221; (8:4)<strong>25</strong>.  These are no doubt slogans of some kind, possibly (but not necessarily) used by the Corinthians.  Horsely contends that the slogan &#8220;there is no other God but one&#8221; is a basic Jewish confession that &#8220;God is one&#8221; found in Josephus, Pseudo-Sophocles, and of course Philo as a lesson that Moses continually teaches in the Laws.<strong>26</strong> Our other slogan:  &#8220;an idol is nothing in the world,&#8221; is also found in Philo&#8217;s writings and Hellenistic Judaism as a critique of false gods.<strong>27</strong> Horsely is probably correct on these points, but is it the Corinthians who are saying these things or Paul?  Paul seems, on the surface, to explain these slogans in (8:5-6).  But why would he need to explain them if the Corinthians use the slogans themselves?  Is Paul giving a more correct definition?  It seems Paul is not giving a better definition, but introducing the idea or better yet; at least reminding the Corinthians.  He is reminding them why idols have no value and also reminding them that others have not this gnosis (8:7).</p>
<p>If the Corinthians were parading these slogans around, Paul would not have needed to define their meaning; therefore, it is Paul introducing Hellenistic Jewish terminology (probably as a corrective reminder) and not the Corinthians in this instance.  It is likely Paul taught these slogans to the Corinthians (he includes himself when he says &#8220;we know&#8221;), but they went overboard in using them.  However, Paul is not using these slogans as a Hellenistic Jew in line with Philo, but just borrowing them for sake of convenience because many probably heard them before.  Jews would not be the only ones to appreciate these slogans, but also pagans because they did not worship idols either.  We also must remember that many who adhered to Platonic philosophy also knew God was one.  Celsus reminds us that Heraclitus said:  &#8220;those who worship images as gods are as foolish as men who talk to the walls.&#8221;<strong>28</strong> Paul, then, is just bridging cultural boundaries here.</p>
<p>We have so far looked at a couple of examples of how Paul uses the term gnosis along with some slogans, but we must also observe how he uses sophia, since he uses it quite frequently in the first four chapters.  Paul asks, &#8220;Has not God made foolish the sophia of this world?&#8221; (1:19).  This is a general use of sophia entailing all versions of wisdom.  Paul is saying that the world has never understood God through its wisdom (1:21).  Paul then speaks of the sophia of God (2:7) as hidden in a mystery ordained through all the ages.  We can describe this as apocalyptic&#8211;both esoteric and eschatological since it transcends time; pertaining to the future as it has all through the past.  But are these usage&#8217;s gnostic or Hellenic?  They are neither because Paul&#8217;s sophia is general in one sense (as opposed to the personified Sophia of Jewish Hellenism), and incomprehensible unless revealed by the Spirit of God (2:10) which might seem gnostic at first glance but is not because Paul&#8217;s sophia of God is not salvivic.  For Paul, having the mind of Christ is not salvation, but being known by God is&#8211;which is also proof that one loves Him (8:3).</p>
<p>Now that we have discussed some examples of how Paul uses sophia and gnosis, we must also discuss why he is on the subject.  Someone had to teach the Corinthians these things.  We have already seen how Paul possibly taught the Corinthians some Jewish slogans they were using, and how he includes himself with them as having used them.  When he says &#8220;we all have gnosis&#8221; he again includes himself, which hints that he is recounting past lessons he, himself, taught them.  But we also know that Paul did not work alone in Corinth.  Another teacher, Apollos, was present in Corinth who was both able and eloquent.  Acts tells us (18:24-28) that Apollos was a Jew from Alexandria, mighty in the scriptures, being fervent in the Spirit taught accurately though he knew only the baptism of John, and was discovered speaking boldly against the Jews in Ephesus by Priscilla and Aquila&#8211;who taught him more accurately.<strong>29 </strong> Priscilla and Aquila probably recruited Apollos to come to Corinth and help Paul with the new church there.  Is Apollos the source of Alexandrian (Philonic) Jewish Hellenism?  Is Paul thus reacting against something Apollos brought in?  Obviously Apollos was influential since a faction developed bearing his name against Paul.  What then is the relationship between Paul and Apollos?</p>
<p>Richard Horsley believes that the Corinthians almost certainly, through the ministry of the Alexandrian Jew Apollos, got caught up in an enthusiastic devotion to Sophia along the same lines as expressed in Sap. Sal. and Philo.<strong>30 </strong>The problem in this interpretation is Paul&#8217;s treatment of Apollos in the Biblical text.  Paul describes his relationship with Apollos in positive terms as an equal co-worker who watered where he had planted (3:6).  Again, Paul describes himself and Apollos as &#8220;fellow-workers&#8221; (3:9), while also reiterating that the &#8220;one who plants and the one who waters are one&#8221; (3:8).  From these statements, it is quite clear that Paul is no where at odds with anything Apollos has said or done.  He, in fact, considers Apollos&#8217; ministry as a beneficial compliment to his own.  Apollos, therefore, is not the source of Alexandrian Hellenism according to what we see in Paul.</p>
<p>However, one might say that Paul is only being diplomatic; trying not to aggravate an already delicate situation.  Paul may have been trying to avoid a fight with those who followed Apollos since his authority was already hanging in the balance.  But of course, if Paul once took Peter on without hesitation, it is more than likely he did not fear Apollos since he still had followers to back him up anyway.  It stands then that Paul is not even concerned with Apollos as a potential threat.  If anything, Apollos was the one left in charge of the church when Paul left in the first place.  This might explain why Priscilla and Aquila brought him back to Corinth&#8211;as an able leader to succeed Paul.</p>
<p>What we must conclude then is that Horsley is guilty of trying to &#8220;get behind&#8221; the Apostle Paul to the &#8220;real&#8221; historical situation of Corinth.  He forgets, however, that it is by Paul that we even know anything at all about the Corinthian church.  Since it is Paul who is relaying the information, we have to stay within Paul&#8217;s context.  Anything outside of these parameters is pure speculation and futile.  In short, since Paul considered his ministry complimentary with Apollos&#8217;, we have to accept Paul&#8217;s view; furthermore, if Apollos brought in Philonic ideas, Paul would then have been an accomplice.  This is very unlikely for why would Paul have a problem with something he taught himself?  Finally, if Apollos is the only link to Alexandria and Philo we have, and it has been sufficiently proven that his ministry was in conjunction with Paul&#8217;s theology (which does not agree with Philo&#8217;s); Philonic Jewish Hellenism must not have been what Paul was arguing against.  Outside of where they were born, there is no link between Philo and Apollos.<!--more--></p>
<p><strong>III  The Structure and Nature of Gnosis in Gnosticism</strong></p>
<p>Now that it has been sufficiently proven that Jewish Hellenism is not the source of the Corinthian conflict, we must now consider the final possibility of proto-gnosticism.  We have already established quite easily that there was no Gnostic &#8220;system&#8221; in Corinth like those of the second and third centuries (the cultural plurality and the evidence of factions is full proof against such a possibility).  Hans Conzelmann, in his commentary, however calls the Corinthians proto-gnostics.<strong>31 </strong> This means that they were the early primitive forerunners of the fully developed systems found in the Gnostic schools of Alexandria; which the heresiologists railed against as the most hated enemy of &#8220;orthodox&#8221; Christianity.  In lieu of our conclusion that the Alexandrian Apollos was not the source of Alexandrian Hellenism, we must question any Corinthian connection to the evolution of Christian Gnosticism.  In fact, we must question whether the Corinthians exhibited any semblance of gnosticizing at all.  We may clarify this with a better understanding of what being a gnostic is.</p>
<p>Gnosis, as defined by Kurt Rudolph, has its constituent elements; usually adaptations from existing traditions transformed into a completely new character and a new significance.<strong>32</strong> It is rooted in ancient mythology and current religion&#8211;a syncretism.<strong>33</strong> Thereby the possessor of gnosis, or gnostic, is literally a &#8220;knower.&#8221;<strong>34</strong> One key feature of gnosis is the concept of the &#8220;divine spark&#8221; (pneuma or &#8220;spirit&#8221;) within man that must be reawakened and restored to its origin in the divine world.<strong>35</strong> This entails the redemption of the gnostic&#8211;his or her reconciliation with the true God of the universe.  This leads to a dualism (similar but not exactly to that of Plato) between &#8220;light&#8221; and &#8220;darkness,&#8221; &#8220;body&#8221; and &#8220;matter,&#8221; and the world with its rulers who hold it in slavery (its inhabitants are prisoners) against the true God of virtue who is above all other gods.<strong>36</strong></p>
<p>Gnosis is usually gained only by divine revelation to one considered &#8220;elect&#8221; or worthy.  Gerard Luttikhuizen explains the main characteristic of gnostic revelation is the initial perplexity and ignorance of the recipient prior to the appearance of the heavenly revealer as seen in the Gnostic dialogues:  The Sophia of Jesus Christ, The Apocryphon of John, The Letter of Peter to Philip, and The Gospel of Mary.<strong>37</strong> The gnostic thus becomes a spiritual &#8220;elite&#8221; over the rest of humanity living in the darkness of the world.  However, it is never seen that a gnostic claims any right to rule over the rest of humanity.  The goal is escape from the world of the Demiurge; not to rule within it.  From these definitions of what being a gnostic is, do the Corinthians fit these examples?   It seems that the Corinthians aligned themselves into factions based on personalities (Apollos, Paul, Cephas, and Christ).  They would say, &#8220;I am of Apollos&#8221; or &#8220;I am of Paul&#8221; (1:12).  The Corinthians, then, are saying that they have received their spiritual knowledge from men.  Gnostic revelation is never from men, but from a heavenly messenger (whether angelic, from Sophia, or God) who is not in the flesh.  Not even those who aligned themselves with Christ could have been gnostics since the typical Gnostic revelation emphasizes the ineffectiveness of Christ to communicate to humans as a man on earth.<strong>38</strong> In fact, the true gnostic would try to avoid the earthly ministry of Jesus as much as possible.  Therefore, the Christ faction in Corinth was probably a group who felt they were the traditionalists following Christ&#8217;s example more accurately than receiving it second-hand from Apollos, Cephas, or Paul.</p>
<p>The Corinthians did view themselves as spiritual elites full of mature spiritual wisdom.  The proof of their maturity was their charismatic utterances through spiritual gifts.  It was these spiritual gifts that the Corinthians were ranking themselves to the consternation of Paul who informs them that the &#8220;one and same Spirit works all these things, distributing to each one individually as He wills&#8221; (12:11).  Also, because of their spiritual maturity, they set themselves up as kings both full and rich (4:8).  True gnostics would not want to reign in the flesh.  The earth, to a gnostic, is a lower world or &#8220;aeon.&#8221;  Gnostics want to ascend to the higher aeons to get closer to the true God of the universe and out of the reach of the Demiurge and his lower aeons.  The Corinthians are thus living something totally different from that of the life of a gnostic.  This leaves us the conclusion that the Corinthians were not proto-gnostics in any form whatsoever since they do not display any of the signs of gnosticism.<!--more--></p>
<p><strong>IV  The Corinthians as Products of the Pagan Spiritual Search</strong></p>
<p>By now it has become quite clear that the religious situation in Corinth had nothing to do with Jewish Hellenism or gnostic influences.  How then can we describe the situation?  Since the Corinthians were &#8220;ruling&#8221; as Paul claims, it is highly possible that they were living as if God&#8217;s kingdom had descended to earth.  Anthony Thiselton calls this &#8220;realized eschatology.&#8221;<strong>39</strong> In the words of C.K. Barrett, &#8220;the Corinthians were behaving as if the age to come were already consummated.&#8221;<strong>40</strong>Thiselton adds to this with his conclusion that &#8220;an over-realized eschatology leads to an enthusiastic view of the Spirit.&#8221;<strong>41</strong> If the Corinthians were living out their salvation, it is no stretch to see the need for an active Holy Spirit in direct communion with the community of believers.</p>
<p>Of course one must immediately ask what did the Corinthians think about the resurrection?  Paul echoes a slogan:  &#8220;Foods for the stomach and the stomach for foods, but God will destroy both it and them&#8221; (6:12).  Obviously this was being said in the congregation.  It is a blatant denial of the resurrection which Paul counters in verse 13.  Here is where injecting gnostic influences becomes the most tempting.  But we know that for gnostics, salvation does not lie in the temporal world.  Thiselton, however, argues that the Corinthians reinterpreted the resurrection to mean their rebirth as Christians because nowhere does it say that they believed they were already resurrected and would never die.<strong>42</strong> However, this is incorrect in light of the above mentioned slogan.  Why would the Corinthians believe they were reborn (being still in flesh) and their bodies doomed for destruction by God?  Would God initiate a rebirth only to destroy it later?  It is far more reasonable to think that the Corinthians never factored in the body at all&#8211;thus denying a resurrection all together.  There is a something at work here, but it is not gnostic&#8211;it is Platonic and traditional.  In fact, the Corinthians might have been attempting to mix Platonic elements with traditional Greek religion.  Here is where old ideas may have resurfaced in the Corinthian minds that Paul and Apollos failed to efface.</p>
<p>In our section of the pagan spiritual search, we found that most wanted a quick salvation in the present.  This is what made philosophy and the mystery religions so appealing.  The slogan about foods and the stomach sounds very much like a Stoic slogan.  Marcus Aurelius says something similar:</p>
<blockquote><p>In the life of a man, his time is but a moment, his being an incessant flux,<br />
his senses a dim rushlight, his body a prey of worms, his soul an unquiet eddy,<br />
his forces dark, and his fame doubtful.  In short, all that is of the body is as<br />
coursing waters, all that is of the soul as dreams and vapors; life a warfare, a<br />
brief sojourning in an alien land; and after repute, oblivion.<strong>43</strong></p></blockquote>
<p>Marcus Aurelius&#8217; eloquent comments portray the dominant theme of the Roman world&#8211;we live and then we die.  No doubt, the Corinthians felt as he did, and this became their motivation to rule as kings because they denied a resurrection of the body.  But this is not to say that the Corinthians were non-religious; their practice of spiritual gifts is testament to a very strong sense of religiosity, however, with a philosophic flavor.</p>
<p>Even in the days of Plato, or better yet Homer; Greek notions of the after life was not a promising hope for most except the glorious heroes like Achilles, Odysseus, Hector, and Heracles whose soul or &#8220;shade&#8221; would spend eternity in the Elysian Fields.  For the average person, however, an inglorious eternity was to be spent in the underworld roaming aimlessly without true form&#8211;somewhat like a forgotten echo.  Life on the surface, however, was where most could gain everlasting immortality through fame.  The after-life, though, was an after-thought.</p>
<p>Religion thus served its purpose for the living as a celebration of life itself.  It was as much a civic institution as government.  It is highly possible that the Corinthians created for themselves a theocracy (an exstention of the Messianic Kingdom) where they ruled by the oracles of the Holy Spirit.  It has already been established that the pagan spiritual search involved the love of oracles and miracle-workers.  These were not just the proofs of their salvation; the manifestations of the Holy Spirit and their religious freedom became their salvation.  But the Corinthians needed a paradigm to organize their community.  Perhaps Plato&#8217;s Republic was the model of their theocracy, a point worth investigating.</p>
<p>Since we know that Paul was concerned with neither gnostic knowledge or Philonic wisdom, it stands that Greek wisdom in general is what he meant, for he says &#8220;Jews seek a sign, and Greeks seek after wisdom&#8221; (1:22).  Plato, no doubt, was the most popular of the Greek philosophers and the most associated with Greek wisdom.  Even Philo in Alexandria was affected by him over three hundred years after his death.  The Corinthians, being closer to Plato&#8217;s Athens, would have been influenced all the more.  Let us, therefore, investigate Plato&#8217;s analogy of the Divided Line as a clue to the Corinthians&#8217; obsession with knowledge.</p>
<p>The Divided Line analogy expresses a boundary relationship between Plato&#8217;s two realities&#8211;the intelligible realm and the physical realm.<strong>44</strong> As, by now, one can guess for Plato; the intelligible realm is superior to the physical realm.  The two realities are divided into four mental states beginning with two states in the intelligible realm and gradually descending (decaying) into the final two states of the physical realm.    State A is Intelligence (noesis); full vision culminating in truth.<strong>45</strong> State B is Reason; the procedure of mathematical reasoning (dianoia), purely deductive and uncritical of its assumptions.<strong>46</strong> This is the lowest limit of the intelligible realm.  State C is Belief (pistis or faith); commonsense beliefs in morals as a practical guide to life, but not well thought out.<strong>47</strong> Finally we are left with state D which is Illusion (eikasia); second hand impressions and opinions of which the minds of ordinary people are full.<strong>48<br />
</strong></p>
<p>Plato&#8217;s analogy sets up his conclusion that only the best (who understand the intelligible) are capable of ruling (i.e. the famous Philosopher King).  Every person, according to Plato, must know their place and not deceive others with pretenses of greater ability.  The Corinthians&#8217; obsession with knowledge and spiritual maturity are no less statements of knowing the intelligible in line with Platonic thought.  From this it becomes easier to understand why they began to value certain spiritual gifts over others as proof of their intellectual status and as markers of rank.  It also might explain why they were dividing into factions:  1) each group claimed a monopoly on the intelligible truth, and 2)  they wished to align themselves with the true philosopher king whether it be Paul, Apollos, Cephas, or Christ.  This, of course, forces Paul to call himself a fool for Christ because he believes or rather has faith (pistis) in the foolishness of God (1:25).  Paul is thus reversing the Platonic order by valuing something based on faith.  Paul is also content to leave the wisdom of God as a mystery revealed through the Spirit (not mathematical reasoning)(2:10).  This is Paul&#8217;s most powerful theological statement in the whole epistle&#8211;God can work salvation through foolish and weak things which the crucifixion is the epitome.</p>
<p>Is there any credibility to this theory? Plato&#8217;s analogy of the Divided Line is an ancient attempt at perception theory.</p>
<blockquote><p>Paul has a perceptional response in 1 Corinthians 13:8-10:<br />
Love never fails.  But whether there are prophecies, they will fail; whether<br />
there are tongues, they will cease; whether there is knowledge, it will pass<br />
away.  For we know in part and we prophesy in part.  But when that which<br />
is perfect has come, then that which is in part will be done away.</p></blockquote>
<p>Paul is thus saying that it is impossible for human beings to gain access to full knowledge until Christ returns.	Paul also says, &#8220;For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then face to face.  Now I know in part, but then I shall know just as I also am known&#8221; (13:12).  Finally Paul concludes with, &#8220;And now abide faith, hope, love, these three; but the greatest of these is love&#8221; (13:13).  This is the &#8220;more excellent way&#8221; Paul wishes to impart on the Corinthians.  It thus can be seen that Paul supersedes Intelligence and Reason with what would be considered to Greek Philosophy, as the most irrational and erratic force in the universe&#8211;love with its derivatives faith and hope.</p>
<p>Is Paul making an antithetical argument against Plato?  Plato would argue that knowledge is found in the Forms&#8211;Ideas expressed in geometric patterns that define the cosmos and are independent of our minds, and are more sure than the senses which can never be trusted because they only impart &#8220;reflections&#8221; of the true Forms.<strong>49 </strong>Paul admits that we see only reflections of the truth in dark mirrors, but Paul emphatically argues that it is not reasonable to discard with the physical senses that produce faith, hope, and love.  Paul has to argue this because it was out of Christ&#8217;s love that he allowed Himself to be crucified so that we might attain salvation and the fullness (pleroma) of God.  This would entail the future obtainment of all knowledge through the mind of Christ (which Paul says we have only in part now).  Paul, therefore, does seem to be arguing against a version of Platonic philosophy.  Also, we can realistically infer that the Corinthians are attempting to establish a Republic along Platonic lines for the organization of the community.  The factions, therefore, are representative of their search for a philosopher king to rule over them.</p>
<p>Now that we have investigated the possibility of Platonic influences in the Corinthian community, we must also recognize the presence of charismatic utterances and other spiritual gifts as signs of religious practice.  This means that Corinthians were not exclusively utilizing philosophy as the basis of their way of life.  They seem to be balancing their philosophic tendencies with a very vigorous &#8220;enthusiastic&#8221; use of the Spirit.  As we have noted earlier, this enthusiasm is the by-product of an over-realized eschatology of the Corinthian church.  The question remains, and it is our final question to consider, what is the source of their religious practice?</p>
<p>Just as we have seen how traditional philosophic ideas crept into the Corinthian church as an explanation for their concerns with knowledge and wisdom; we find that tradition Greek religion is present as well.  The charismatic utterances employed by the Corinthians through the Holy Spirit became a Christian adaptation to oracular divination as found in such sacred places as Delphi and Eleusis.  Having oracles was the nearest link to the divine realm where the pious might get one step ahead of Fate which, as we noted earlier, was very much a major concern for the ordinary person of the first century.</p>
<p>Adding to the need for oracles, the Corinthians display something not unlike the Greek mystery cult of Dionysus (Bacchus) the god of wine and orgasmic frenzy&#8211;the effects of wine.  Somehow the Corinthians have associated Christ with Dionysus.  It is highly possible the confusion is related to the Lord&#8217;s Supper.  It seems that when the Corinthians gathered for the supper, many became drunk (11:21), and were eating the supper in an unworthy manner (11:27, and 11:29).  These actions (generally any excessive behavior) resemble the mystery rites of Dionysus which are detrimental to the well-being of the oikos or family.<strong>50</strong> For Paul, this behavior was detrimental to the oikos of Christ.<br />
Does Paul hint that the Corinthians were engaging in the Lord&#8217;s Supper as a mystery rite?  We can only find a subtle inference.  Paul exhorts the Corinthians to be &#8220;servants of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God&#8221; (4:1).  They are to do this by imitating him (4:16).  Instead of excessive behaviors, desire to rule, and gaining worldly wisdom; the Corinthians are to be willing to suffer as Paul.  Paul, then, does appear to be defining a new mystery ordained by God and revealed not in wine, oracles, or knowledge, but by the Spirit of God (2:10).</p>
<p>How else does Dionysus fit into the Corinthians&#8217; religious practices?  According to Dowden, Dionysus is the &#8220;arriving god&#8221; who represents the unrestrained forces in nature opposed to civilization and human (Greek) achievement.<strong>51</strong> He becomes an outlet&#8211;a release&#8211;of wild enthusiasm necessary in balancing the rigors of civility.  Dionysus, therefore, is not a contradiction to the Corinthians&#8217; obsession with the pursuit of wisdom and knowledge; but an acceptable outlet of tension, pleasure, and other physical desires that are repressed for the sake of gaining knowledge.  Dionysus is thus replaced with Christ who said He was the new wine, and the branch from which all vines shoot forth.  Furthermore, the death, blood, and resurrection of Christ becomes representative of an oblation poured out for humankind just like how Dionysus (who also represents Spring growth) must die so that winter can set in; and then later be resurrected the next Spring so that vegetation can germinate once again.  Just like Christ, Dionysus represents a rebirth and a renewal.  And Christ, like Dionysus, is an arriving God for He is still to come at the parousia.  The old myths of Dionysus, therefore, are not easily effaced from the minds of the Corinthians especially with so many similarities exhibited by Christ. <!--more--></p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Our investigation has disproved three things and attempted to offer as two possibilities as better solutions.  We have sufficiently disproved that the Corinthians had a Gnostic system.  We also disproved the notion that Philonic Jewish Hellenism was the source of any gnosticizing or that it was transmitted through the ministry of Apollos.  Finally, we disproved the notion of the Corinthians as proto-gnostics; the forerunners of Gnostic Christianity.  We did, however, offer the possibilities that the Corinthians were experimenting with Platonic philosophy in an attempt to establish a theocracy, while also balancing this with the practice of mystery cultism possibly derived from the cult of Dionysus.  What then emerged in Corinth was the syncretism of philosophy and religion, which is not too surprising since Corinth was a melting pot of cultural ideas in a world where everyone was searching for salvation identity without having to wait for the after-life.   <!--more--></p>
<p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p>
<p>Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, trans.  Maxiwell Staniforth, New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1977.</p>
<p>Raymond Bryan Brown, &#8220;1 Corinthians,&#8221; The Broadman Bible Commentary, V.10, ed. Clifton J. Allen, Nashville:  The Broadman Press, 1970.</p>
<p>Celsus, On the True Doctrine:  A Discourse Against the Christians, trans.  R. Joseph Hoffmann, New York:  Oxford University Press, 1987.</p>
<p>Hans Conzelmann, &#8220;1 Corinthians,&#8221; Hermeneia, trans.  James W. Leitch, Philadelphia:  Fortress Press, 1975.</p>
<p>William G. Doty, &#8220;The Classification of Epistolary Literature,&#8221;  Catholic Biblical Quarterly, V.31, 1969, ed. Joseph Fitzmeyer, Washington D.C:  The Catholic Biblical Association of America.</p>
<p>Ken Dowden, The Uses of Greek Mythology, New York:  Routledge, 1992.</p>
<p>Michael Grant, The World of Rome, New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1960.</p>
<p>Richard A. Horsley, &#8220;Gnosis in Corinth:  1 Corinthians 8:1-6,&#8221; New Testament Studies, V.27, 1980-81, ed. R. Mcl. Wilson, New York:  Cambridge University Press.</p>
<p>Richard A. Horsley, &#8220;How Can Some of You Say that There is no Resurrection of the Dead?:  Spiritual Elitism in Corinth,&#8221; Novum Testamentum, V.20, 1978, ed. W.C. Van Unnik, Leiden, The Netherlands:  E. J. Brill.</p>
<p>Gerard P. Luttikhuizen, &#8220;The Evaluation of the Teaching of Jesus in Christian Gnostic Revelation Dialogues,&#8221; Novem Testamentum, V.30, 1988, ed. C.K. Barrett et. al., Leiden, The Netherlands:  E. J. Brill.</p>
<p>Plato, The Republic, trans.  Sir Desmond Lee, New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1987.</p>
<p>Kurt Rudolph, Gnosis:  The Nature and History of Gnosticism, trans. and ed.  Robert McLachlan Wilson, San Fransico:  HarperCollins Publishers, 1987.</p>
<p>Seneca, Letters From a Stoic, trans. Robin Campbell, New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1969.</p>
<p>Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World, New York:  Oxford University Press, 1965.</p>
<p>Anthony Thiselton, &#8220;Realized Eschatology at Corinth,&#8221; New Testament Studies, V.24, 1978, ed. R. Mcl. Wilson, New York:  Cambridge University Press.</p>
<p><strong>Endnotes</strong></p>
<p>1 Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 604.<br />
2 Actually, more often than not, the period was a time of cross-cultural sharing of old ideas.<br />
3 Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World, p. 604.<br />
4 Michael Grant, The World of Rome, (New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1960), p. 149.<br />
5 Ibid., p. 152.<br />
6 Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World, p. 605.<br />
7 Ibid., pp. 605-606.<br />
8 Seneca, Letters From a Stoic, trans. Robin Campbell, (New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), p. 37.  Excerpted from letter V.  Seneca goes on to say that life should be a compromise between the ideal and the popular morality.<br />
9 Raymond Bryan Brown, &#8220;1 Corinthians,&#8221; The Broadman Bible Commentary, V.10, ed. Clifton J. Allen (Nashville:  Broadman Press, 1970), p. 287.<br />
10 Ibid., p. 287.<br />
11 Ibid., p. 291.<br />
12 Ibid., p. 291.<br />
13 Hans Conzelmann, &#8220;1 Corinthians,&#8221; Hermeneia, (Philadelphia:  Fortress Press, 1975), p.13.  The actual dates of Gallio&#8217;s proconsulship are uncertain as is the whole dating of Paul&#8217;s missionary travels.  This is the best working approximation.<br />
14 Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World, p. 607.<br />
15 Richard A. Horsley, &#8220;Gnosis in Corinth:  1 Corinthians 8:1-6,&#8221; New Testament Studies, V.27, (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 34.<br />
16 In Chapters 4, 8, and 9 of Proverbs we see Lady Wisdom as the proper consort of the righteous and wise man.  Philo&#8217;s Sophia is more than a personification; he actually deifies her to the role of divine mediator to humanity and consort of God as an agent in creation.   Christian writers have done something similiar with ascribing &#8220;Logos&#8221; or word to Christ.<br />
17 Richard A. Horsley, &#8220;Gnosis in Corinth 1 Corinthians 8:1-6,&#8221; p. 33.<br />
18 Ibid., p. 34.<br />
19 Ibid., p. 35.<br />
20 Ibid., p. 34.<br />
21 William G. Doty, &#8220;The Classification of Epistolary Literature,&#8221; Catholic Biblical Quarterly, V.31, (Washington D.C:  The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1969), pp. 183-184.<br />
22 Ibid., p. 193.<br />
23 Paul describes four groups:  1) those who follow him, 2) those who follow Apollos, 3) those who follow Cephas&#8211;which is the Apostle Peter, and 4)  those who simply follow Christ.  Anthony Thiselton says that Paul attacks the Corinthians&#8217; tendency to overvalue certain individual personalities (including himself), and also the danger of undervaluing the ministry as a whole.  Anthony C. Thiselton, &#8220;Realized Eschatology at Corinth,&#8221; New Testament Studies, V.24, (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 513.<br />
24 Note the similarity between how Paul introduces slogans and how Seneca introduces a Stoic motto.  Both state how well known their slogans are.  This is a good example of how freely Stoic and Jewish ideas circulated within the Empire&#8211;enough for them to admit their popularity.  This is also shows that Paul realizes all of the factions were aware of these slogans and could identifiy with their message; whether they be Jew or Greek.<br />
25 Richard A. Horsley, &#8220;Gnosis in Corinth,&#8221; p. 36.<br />
26 Ibid., p. 37.<br />
27 Celsus, On the True Doctrine, trans. R. Joseph Hoffmann, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 53.<br />
28 He was already teaching accurately from the scriptures from what he knew before Priscilla and Aquila met him.  They probably explained to Apollos that he should also preach to the gentiles like Paul.  They might have also explained about the Holy Spirit to him like Paul did to those in Ephesus, who like Apollos, had only the baptism of John.  It is unlikely that they explained the scriptures to Apollos because he was already &#8220;mighty&#8221; with them.<br />
29 Richard A. Horsley, &#8220;How Can Some of You Say that There is no Resurrection of the Dead?:  Spiritual Elitism in Corinth,&#8221; Novum Testamentum, (Leiden, The Netherlands:  E. J. Brill, 1978), p. 229.<br />
30 Hans Conzelmann, &#8220;1 Corinthians,&#8221; p. 15.<br />
31 Kurt Rudolph, Gnosis:  The Nature and History of Gnosticism, trans.  and ed.  Robert Mclachlan Wilson, (San Fransico:  HarperCollins Publishers, 1987), p. 54.<br />
32 Ibid., p. 54.<br />
33 Ibid., p. 55.<br />
34 Ibid., p. 57.<br />
35 Ibid., p. 58.  Note that light and darkness are euphemisms for good and evil, body and matter for flesh and spirit, and the world with its rulers is the God of creation (the Demiurge); who is inferior to the invisible and incomprehensible true God of the universe and His consort Sophia.  The gnostic thus lives in an antithetical world where he or she is caught in the middle of the titanic struggle of the universal deities.  Gnosis is the key to escaping the Demiurge and reconciliation to the true God.<br />
36 Gerard P. Luttikhuizen, &#8220;The Evaluation of the Teaching of Jesus in Christian Gnostic Revelation Dialogues,&#8221; Novum Testamentum, V.30, ed. C.K. Barrett et. al., (Leiden, The Netherlands:  E. J. Brill, 1988), p. 158.<br />
37Ibid., pp. 160-161.  Yes it is possible that those who aligned themselves with Christ may have been claiming to have received some revelation from the risen Christ from heaven, but in all probability all they knew about Christ was what Paul had explained to them.  Ironically, Paul himself could be viewed as somekind of gnostic because of his revelation on the road to Damascus.  Paul, however, never describes his experience as mystic, but as a more humbling episode in his life that made him appreciate the human Jesus as his Lord.  If Paul were a gnostic, he could never had embraced the cross of Christ&#8211;an act of salvation achieved in the flesh and not the spirit.<br />
38 Anthony C. Thiselton, &#8220;Realized Eschatology at Corinth,&#8221; p. 510.<br />
39 Ibid., p. 510.<br />
40 Ibid., p. 512.  Thiselton is using this argument to explain why the Corinthians overemphasized charismatic utterances&#8211;as necessary proof that they were living in God&#8217;s kingdom.<br />
41 Ibid., p. 523.<br />
42 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, trans.  Maxwell Staniforth, (New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1977), p. 51.  Though Marcus Aurelius lived much later than our time period here, he is still one of the classic models of a Stoic.<br />
43 Plato, The Republic, trans.  Desmond Lee, (New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1987), pp. 309-310.<br />
44 Ibid., p. 311.  For Plato this is achieved by Philosophy.<br />
45 Ibid., p. 311.<br />
46 Ibid., p. 311.<br />
47 Ibid., p. 311.<br />
48 Ibid., p. 264.<br />
49 Ken Dowden, The Uses of Greek Mythology, (New York:  Routledge, 1992) p. 166.<br />
50 Ibid., p. 99.</p>
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>New Testament scholarship has long sought to recount the religious situation in Corinth as addressed by the Apostle Paul in his letters to the Corinthians.  The most tantalizing question is whether or not the Corinthians were Gnostics, proto-gnostics, or something related to Jewish Hellenism.  It is now certain that the Corinthians definitely were not Gnostics like Valentinus, Basilides, or Marcion of the second and third centuries.  However, many scholars are still maintaining that the Corinthians were proto-gnostics or the forerunners of Gnosticism; possibly influenced by the Jewish Hellenistic school located in Alexandria.  This paper shall attempt to show the true nature behind the uses of sophia (wisdom) and gnosis (knowledge) in the Pauline corpus as innocent references to secular wisdom in general; not just an exclusive avenue of Hellenistic thought.  Furthermore, we shall investigate the extent of Jewish influences, namely that of Philo and the possible link with Apollos of Alexandria.  It is hoped that through a historical, geographical, and exegetical approach; a more clear understanding of the Corinthian religious situation, as a random phenomenon of Roman environmental circumstances, can be established.</p>
<p><strong>I  The Spiritual Search of the Pagan World</strong></p>
<p>The world of Paul and the Corinthians was a period of spiritual, political, and<br />
cultural fluctuation.  Ideas were moving freely across the Empire thanks to a Roman policy of tolerance.  This process set the stage for Christianity as eloquently stated by Starr:</p>
<blockquote><p>A major element in the spread of Christianity was the fact that the pagan world<br />
was already moving, though blindly, in the direction that Christian thought<br />
was to take more consciously.  Neither a Roman poet like Virgil nor a<br />
Greek philosopher like Epictetus would have understood the statement that<br />
he was a forerunner of Christianity, yet it is true that many thinkers and<br />
artists of the Empire reflect the contemporary spiritual uneasiness and<br />
the search for meaning in a vast, materialistic world.<strong>1</strong></p></blockquote>
<p>Starr&#8217;s comments are not only an accurate assessment, but they also hint as to what was going on at Corinth.  The Corinthians were experiencing new ideas (Christianity being the primary item), but the residue of old ideas may have not been entirely effaced from the Corinthian minds.  We shall come back to this very important point later on in our investigation.</p>
<p>As we have just seen, the whole drive of imperial culture was in the direction of new concepts <strong>2</strong> of man and of the divine.<strong>3</strong> Roman hegemony tended to alienate the people across the Empire; causing them to seek after things pertaining to identity, purpose, and security.  Roman authority, being supreme and supra-national, meant exile in one&#8217;s own country; therefore, religion and philosophy became outlets for unsatisfied faith and lost pride&#8211;otherwise filled by the love of one&#8217;s nation.  Quite simply, the Roman age was a time not only of uncontrolled blood lust, but of pessimism and nerve failure regarding the powers of man to work out his own future.<strong>4</strong> This was a world dominated by Fortune, Fate, and daemons.<strong>5</strong> It is no wonder that the Corinthians were looking for something substantive (gnosis) here and now, rather than waiting for the return of Christ or undergoing a process of sanctification.  Salvivic knowledge of any kind was desperately sought.</p>
<p>Where did one find such knowledge?  The choices were limitless and all vying for the attention of anyone interested.  During this time, we find a significant respect for oracles, miracle-workers, and a host of emotional, personal mystery faiths.<strong>6</strong> From Egypt came the Hellenized cult of Isis the mother of all, from Persia came Mithras with its Babylonian astrology, Cybele (the Great Mother) was worshipped since 204 B.C., and of course Rome introduced emperor worship to accompany the old pantheon of gods of Classical Greece.<strong>7</strong></p>
<p>Religion was not the only way to fill the spiritual void.  Philosophy was yet another option available to the first century seeker of truth and knowledge.  It offered more immediate results than a promise of the after-life.  Some philosophic schools were interested in a way of living more than salvation.  Epicureans and Stoics were examples of this.  They offered a code of conduct rather than a faith.  Epicureans preached contentment through a pursuit of non-excessive pleasures.  Stoics emphasized the acceptance of being only an insignificant part of the cosmos where all one must do is simply fulfill the role nature has assigned.  Seneca sums it up nicely:</p>
<blockquote><p>Our motto, as everyone knows, is to live in conformity with nature:  it is<br />
quite contrary to nature to torture one&#8217;s body, to reject simple standards<br />
of cleanliness and make a point of being dirty, to adopt a diet that is not<br />
just plain but hideous and revolting&#8230;  Philosophy calls for simple living, not<br />
for doing penance, and the simple way of life need not be a crude one.<strong>8</strong></p></blockquote>
<p>Seneca&#8217;s call for a simple and realistic life is a practical approach in an age of anxiety filled with so many pathways to heaven.  Seneca&#8217;s dry remark on penance is just one example felt by many  that religion can be a torture which thwarts happiness in the present world.  The mentality is:  &#8220;why must we wait for heaven to come down to us, or us to ascend to heaven, when we can live out our salvation now?&#8221;  No doubt Paul deals with a similar mentality in Corinth.<br />
The brief sketch of the Roman world is necessary for our argument because it explains to us that nature of the surroundings Paul had to work within.  But what about Corinth itself?  Raymond Brown, in his commentary, reminds us that the Corinth Paul visited was not continuous with the ancient city that was destroyed by the Roman consul, Lucius Mummius in 146 B.C.<strong>9</strong> Julius Caesar began its restoration in 44 B.C., enticing Jews, Greeks, Romans, and Orientals to gravitate to the city because it was a mighty commercial sea port ranking with Alexandria, Ephesus, and Rome itself as one of the most important cities in the Empire.<strong>10</strong> Corinth was thus a melting pot of cultures that mixed their ideas as well as their commerce.</p>
<p>It is highly probable that Gnostic ideas from Alexandria made their way across the Mediterranean to Corinth as a by-product of commercial trade, but does Paul necessarily deal with it in his letters to the Corinthians?  Rudolph Bultmann thought Gnosticism crept into Corinth via Alexandria and its Hellenistic Jewish contingency through a syncretistic process, as did Schmithals and Wilckens who found a Gnostic Christology among the opponents of Paul in 1 Corinthians.<strong>11</strong> Brown, however, correctly states that gnosticizing tendencies are not sufficient to substantiate a developed system or theology&#8211;furthermore, Corinth as a melting pot, would never have been an ideal place for one to develop.<strong>12</strong> Of course, we still have to deal with the lingering scholarly consensus that they were proto-gnostics influenced by Alexandrian Jewish Hellenism, but we must first turn our attention to Paul before we can.</p>
<p>Now that we have discounted the possibility of an organized Gnostic &#8220;system&#8221; at Corinth, let us recount Paul and his visit to the city.  We know from the Acts of the Apostles that Paul came to Corinth after his missionary venture in Athens (18:1 NKJV).  He met Aquila and Priscilla, Jews who had recently arrived in Corinth because of the expulsion from Rome ordered by Claudius (18:2).  Acts also tells us that Paul was in Corinth during the proconsulship of Gallio (18:12).  Hans Conzelmann dates Gallio&#8217;s proconsulship between 51 A.D. to as late as 53 A.D.<strong>13</strong> Paul, therefore, remained in Corinth sometime during these years&#8211;a lengthy enough time for the Corinthians to fully understand his teachings.  Paul stayed on this long as the founder of a new church, probably organizing leaders and teaching them so that they could continue on without him for it is likely he knew he would be moving on.  Paul&#8217;s lengthy stay is important because, even in spite of it, the Corinthians deviate from his teachings soon after he leaves.  Many scholars believe that Jewish Hellenism from Alexandria moved into the Corinthian church at this time; possibly derived from the Jewish writer Philo.</p>
<p>In Alexandria arose the greatest Jewish scholar of the Diaspora, Philo (c. 30 B.C.&#8211;45 A.D.), who essayed to reconcile Plato and the Bible, while giving priority in invention to Moses, and developed an allegorical method of interpreting the Old Testament for that purpose.<strong>14</strong> In Philo&#8217;s writings, he shows a profound personal intimacy with the heavenly Sophia (feminine personification of wisdom).<strong>15 </strong> Lady Wisdom or Sophia is the central character of Hellenistic Jewish wisdom literature.  She has been a literary figure used even in the Bible.<strong>16</strong> Richard Horsley maintains that it is this view that the Corinthians have in mind with their usage of sophia in 1 Corinthians 1-4.<strong>17 </strong> Of course we have to remember that it is Paul who writes the term, and not the Corinthians; therefore, we must understand his usage of it.  But for Philo, Sophia was the giver of wisdom and knowledge (gnosis), usually &#8220;knowledge of God&#8221; or &#8220;knowledge of truth.&#8221;<strong>18 </strong> Gnosis thus becomes the religious theological content of sophia; an expression or one manifestation of it.<strong>19 </strong> The recipients thereby have a special religious status, as &#8220;wise&#8221; or &#8220;righteous&#8221; or &#8220;perfect.&#8221;<strong>20</strong> Since it is through Paul&#8217;s context we must proceed, let us look briefly at the literary characteristics of 1 Corinthians.  By analyzing the structure of 1 Corinthians, we can better understand who and what Paul is addressing, and whether or not Jewish Hellenism is the culprit of the ideas he is attacking.   <span id="more-78"></span></p>
<p><strong>II  Literary Form, Terminology, and the Role of Apollos in 1 Corinthians</strong></p>
<p>Adolf Deissmann defined the epistle as an &#8220;artistic letter&#8221; or a piece of literature, while a letter would be more of an &#8220;experience&#8221; and &#8220;artless.&#8221;<strong>21</strong> Doty adds to this the Artemonian definition of epistles as &#8220;half of a dialogue&#8221; or a &#8220;dialogue halved.&#8221;<strong>22</strong> 1 Corinthians is most definitely a dialogue halved since Paul directly addresses the Corinthians (as like in a discussion) in (2:3)&#8211;&#8221;I was with you in weakness&#8230;&#8221;  Paul also asks direct conversational questions:  &#8220;Where is the wise?&#8221; (1:20), &#8220;For who makes you differ from another?&#8221; (4:7).  Paul asks these questions as if it were his own fault that the Corinthians had gone astray.  One must remember Paul spent the greater part of two years teaching the Corinthians; it is highly possible that he felt they misunderstood him, and wanted to be aware of any others who might have confused them.</p>
<p>This last point brings us to the fact that in 1 Corinthians, Paul makes us aware of four factions (1:11-12)<strong>23</strong> in the Corinthian church&#8211;which should not surprise us since Corinth was a major commercial sea port where cultures and ideas mixed and often clashed together.  This is very important because it is these four factions that Paul is addressing throughout the letter.  It stands to reason that they disagreed on their theology, therefore, Paul&#8217;s use of sophia and gnosis are general terms that are both applicable and interchangeable for all of the factions.<strong>24</strong></p>
<p>Upon this last conclusion, let us look at some examples of how Paul uses sophia and gnosis in chapters 1-4 of 1 Corinthians.   Paul says in (1:5), &#8220;&#8230;that you were enriched in every thing by Him in all utterance and knowledge (gnosis)&#8230;  This statement comes from the thanksgiving section of the epistle where Paul thanks God for the revelational gnosis He has imparted upon the Corinthian church.  Gnosis in this sense is positive as &#8220;knowledge of God.&#8221;  It is significant to notice that Paul is crediting the Corinthians with some religious knowledge, but he still labels them &#8220;carnal&#8221; (3:3) which forces him to still give them spiritual &#8220;milk&#8221; rather than &#8220;solid food&#8221; (3:2).  It is because of the existence of divisions (factions) that they are carnal&#8211;&#8221;behaving like mere men&#8221; (3:3).</p>
<p>Now Paul shifts gears in chapter 8 when he begins a discussion on things sacrificed to idols.  He makes the statement:  &#8220;We know that we all have gnosis&#8221; (8:1).  Paul hear is commenting on how every Christian knows that &#8220;an idol is nothing in the world,&#8221; and &#8220;there is no other God but one&#8221; (8:4)<strong>25</strong>.  These are no doubt slogans of some kind, possibly (but not necessarily) used by the Corinthians.  Horsely contends that the slogan &#8220;there is no other God but one&#8221; is a basic Jewish confession that &#8220;God is one&#8221; found in Josephus, Pseudo-Sophocles, and of course Philo as a lesson that Moses continually teaches in the Laws.<strong>26</strong> Our other slogan:  &#8220;an idol is nothing in the world,&#8221; is also found in Philo&#8217;s writings and Hellenistic Judaism as a critique of false gods.<strong>27</strong> Horsely is probably correct on these points, but is it the Corinthians who are saying these things or Paul?  Paul seems, on the surface, to explain these slogans in (8:5-6).  But why would he need to explain them if the Corinthians use the slogans themselves?  Is Paul giving a more correct definition?  It seems Paul is not giving a better definition, but introducing the idea or better yet; at least reminding the Corinthians.  He is reminding them why idols have no value and also reminding them that others have not this gnosis (8:7).</p>
<p>If the Corinthians were parading these slogans around, Paul would not have needed to define their meaning; therefore, it is Paul introducing Hellenistic Jewish terminology (probably as a corrective reminder) and not the Corinthians in this instance.  It is likely Paul taught these slogans to the Corinthians (he includes himself when he says &#8220;we know&#8221;), but they went overboard in using them.  However, Paul is not using these slogans as a Hellenistic Jew in line with Philo, but just borrowing them for sake of convenience because many probably heard them before.  Jews would not be the only ones to appreciate these slogans, but also pagans because they did not worship idols either.  We also must remember that many who adhered to Platonic philosophy also knew God was one.  Celsus reminds us that Heraclitus said:  &#8220;those who worship images as gods are as foolish as men who talk to the walls.&#8221;<strong>28</strong> Paul, then, is just bridging cultural boundaries here.</p>
<p>We have so far looked at a couple of examples of how Paul uses the term gnosis along with some slogans, but we must also observe how he uses sophia, since he uses it quite frequently in the first four chapters.  Paul asks, &#8220;Has not God made foolish the sophia of this world?&#8221; (1:19).  This is a general use of sophia entailing all versions of wisdom.  Paul is saying that the world has never understood God through its wisdom (1:21).  Paul then speaks of the sophia of God (2:7) as hidden in a mystery ordained through all the ages.  We can describe this as apocalyptic&#8211;both esoteric and eschatological since it transcends time; pertaining to the future as it has all through the past.  But are these usage&#8217;s gnostic or Hellenic?  They are neither because Paul&#8217;s sophia is general in one sense (as opposed to the personified Sophia of Jewish Hellenism), and incomprehensible unless revealed by the Spirit of God (2:10) which might seem gnostic at first glance but is not because Paul&#8217;s sophia of God is not salvivic.  For Paul, having the mind of Christ is not salvation, but being known by God is&#8211;which is also proof that one loves Him (8:3).</p>
<p>Now that we have discussed some examples of how Paul uses sophia and gnosis, we must also discuss why he is on the subject.  Someone had to teach the Corinthians these things.  We have already seen how Paul possibly taught the Corinthians some Jewish slogans they were using, and how he includes himself with them as having used them.  When he says &#8220;we all have gnosis&#8221; he again includes himself, which hints that he is recounting past lessons he, himself, taught them.  But we also know that Paul did not work alone in Corinth.  Another teacher, Apollos, was present in Corinth who was both able and eloquent.  Acts tells us (18:24-28) that Apollos was a Jew from Alexandria, mighty in the scriptures, being fervent in the Spirit taught accurately though he knew only the baptism of John, and was discovered speaking boldly against the Jews in Ephesus by Priscilla and Aquila&#8211;who taught him more accurately.<strong>29 </strong> Priscilla and Aquila probably recruited Apollos to come to Corinth and help Paul with the new church there.  Is Apollos the source of Alexandrian (Philonic) Jewish Hellenism?  Is Paul thus reacting against something Apollos brought in?  Obviously Apollos was influential since a faction developed bearing his name against Paul.  What then is the relationship between Paul and Apollos?</p>
<p>Richard Horsley believes that the Corinthians almost certainly, through the ministry of the Alexandrian Jew Apollos, got caught up in an enthusiastic devotion to Sophia along the same lines as expressed in Sap. Sal. and Philo.<strong>30 </strong>The problem in this interpretation is Paul&#8217;s treatment of Apollos in the Biblical text.  Paul describes his relationship with Apollos in positive terms as an equal co-worker who watered where he had planted (3:6).  Again, Paul describes himself and Apollos as &#8220;fellow-workers&#8221; (3:9), while also reiterating that the &#8220;one who plants and the one who waters are one&#8221; (3:8).  From these statements, it is quite clear that Paul is no where at odds with anything Apollos has said or done.  He, in fact, considers Apollos&#8217; ministry as a beneficial compliment to his own.  Apollos, therefore, is not the source of Alexandrian Hellenism according to what we see in Paul.</p>
<p>However, one might say that Paul is only being diplomatic; trying not to aggravate an already delicate situation.  Paul may have been trying to avoid a fight with those who followed Apollos since his authority was already hanging in the balance.  But of course, if Paul once took Peter on without hesitation, it is more than likely he did not fear Apollos since he still had followers to back him up anyway.  It stands then that Paul is not even concerned with Apollos as a potential threat.  If anything, Apollos was the one left in charge of the church when Paul left in the first place.  This might explain why Priscilla and Aquila brought him back to Corinth&#8211;as an able leader to succeed Paul.</p>
<p>What we must conclude then is that Horsley is guilty of trying to &#8220;get behind&#8221; the Apostle Paul to the &#8220;real&#8221; historical situation of Corinth.  He forgets, however, that it is by Paul that we even know anything at all about the Corinthian church.  Since it is Paul who is relaying the information, we have to stay within Paul&#8217;s context.  Anything outside of these parameters is pure speculation and futile.  In short, since Paul considered his ministry complimentary with Apollos&#8217;, we have to accept Paul&#8217;s view; furthermore, if Apollos brought in Philonic ideas, Paul would then have been an accomplice.  This is very unlikely for why would Paul have a problem with something he taught himself?  Finally, if Apollos is the only link to Alexandria and Philo we have, and it has been sufficiently proven that his ministry was in conjunction with Paul&#8217;s theology (which does not agree with Philo&#8217;s); Philonic Jewish Hellenism must not have been what Paul was arguing against.  Outside of where they were born, there is no link between Philo and Apollos.<!--more--></p>
<p><strong>III  The Structure and Nature of Gnosis in Gnosticism</strong></p>
<p>Now that it has been sufficiently proven that Jewish Hellenism is not the source of the Corinthian conflict, we must now consider the final possibility of proto-gnosticism.  We have already established quite easily that there was no Gnostic &#8220;system&#8221; in Corinth like those of the second and third centuries (the cultural plurality and the evidence of factions is full proof against such a possibility).  Hans Conzelmann, in his commentary, however calls the Corinthians proto-gnostics.<strong>31 </strong> This means that they were the early primitive forerunners of the fully developed systems found in the Gnostic schools of Alexandria; which the heresiologists railed against as the most hated enemy of &#8220;orthodox&#8221; Christianity.  In lieu of our conclusion that the Alexandrian Apollos was not the source of Alexandrian Hellenism, we must question any Corinthian connection to the evolution of Christian Gnosticism.  In fact, we must question whether the Corinthians exhibited any semblance of gnosticizing at all.  We may clarify this with a better understanding of what being a gnostic is.</p>
<p>Gnosis, as defined by Kurt Rudolph, has its constituent elements; usually adaptations from existing traditions transformed into a completely new character and a new significance.<strong>32</strong> It is rooted in ancient mythology and current religion&#8211;a syncretism.<strong>33</strong> Thereby the possessor of gnosis, or gnostic, is literally a &#8220;knower.&#8221;<strong>34</strong> One key feature of gnosis is the concept of the &#8220;divine spark&#8221; (pneuma or &#8220;spirit&#8221;) within man that must be reawakened and restored to its origin in the divine world.<strong>35</strong> This entails the redemption of the gnostic&#8211;his or her reconciliation with the true God of the universe.  This leads to a dualism (similar but not exactly to that of Plato) between &#8220;light&#8221; and &#8220;darkness,&#8221; &#8220;body&#8221; and &#8220;matter,&#8221; and the world with its rulers who hold it in slavery (its inhabitants are prisoners) against the true God of virtue who is above all other gods.<strong>36</strong></p>
<p>Gnosis is usually gained only by divine revelation to one considered &#8220;elect&#8221; or worthy.  Gerard Luttikhuizen explains the main characteristic of gnostic revelation is the initial perplexity and ignorance of the recipient prior to the appearance of the heavenly revealer as seen in the Gnostic dialogues:  The Sophia of Jesus Christ, The Apocryphon of John, The Letter of Peter to Philip, and The Gospel of Mary.<strong>37</strong> The gnostic thus becomes a spiritual &#8220;elite&#8221; over the rest of humanity living in the darkness of the world.  However, it is never seen that a gnostic claims any right to rule over the rest of humanity.  The goal is escape from the world of the Demiurge; not to rule within it.  From these definitions of what being a gnostic is, do the Corinthians fit these examples?   It seems that the Corinthians aligned themselves into factions based on personalities (Apollos, Paul, Cephas, and Christ).  They would say, &#8220;I am of Apollos&#8221; or &#8220;I am of Paul&#8221; (1:12).  The Corinthians, then, are saying that they have received their spiritual knowledge from men.  Gnostic revelation is never from men, but from a heavenly messenger (whether angelic, from Sophia, or God) who is not in the flesh.  Not even those who aligned themselves with Christ could have been gnostics since the typical Gnostic revelation emphasizes the ineffectiveness of Christ to communicate to humans as a man on earth.<strong>38</strong> In fact, the true gnostic would try to avoid the earthly ministry of Jesus as much as possible.  Therefore, the Christ faction in Corinth was probably a group who felt they were the traditionalists following Christ&#8217;s example more accurately than receiving it second-hand from Apollos, Cephas, or Paul.</p>
<p>The Corinthians did view themselves as spiritual elites full of mature spiritual wisdom.  The proof of their maturity was their charismatic utterances through spiritual gifts.  It was these spiritual gifts that the Corinthians were ranking themselves to the consternation of Paul who informs them that the &#8220;one and same Spirit works all these things, distributing to each one individually as He wills&#8221; (12:11).  Also, because of their spiritual maturity, they set themselves up as kings both full and rich (4:8).  True gnostics would not want to reign in the flesh.  The earth, to a gnostic, is a lower world or &#8220;aeon.&#8221;  Gnostics want to ascend to the higher aeons to get closer to the true God of the universe and out of the reach of the Demiurge and his lower aeons.  The Corinthians are thus living something totally different from that of the life of a gnostic.  This leaves us the conclusion that the Corinthians were not proto-gnostics in any form whatsoever since they do not display any of the signs of gnosticism.<!--more--></p>
<p><strong>IV  The Corinthians as Products of the Pagan Spiritual Search</strong></p>
<p>By now it has become quite clear that the religious situation in Corinth had nothing to do with Jewish Hellenism or gnostic influences.  How then can we describe the situation?  Since the Corinthians were &#8220;ruling&#8221; as Paul claims, it is highly possible that they were living as if God&#8217;s kingdom had descended to earth.  Anthony Thiselton calls this &#8220;realized eschatology.&#8221;<strong>39</strong> In the words of C.K. Barrett, &#8220;the Corinthians were behaving as if the age to come were already consummated.&#8221;<strong>40</strong>Thiselton adds to this with his conclusion that &#8220;an over-realized eschatology leads to an enthusiastic view of the Spirit.&#8221;<strong>41</strong> If the Corinthians were living out their salvation, it is no stretch to see the need for an active Holy Spirit in direct communion with the community of believers.</p>
<p>Of course one must immediately ask what did the Corinthians think about the resurrection?  Paul echoes a slogan:  &#8220;Foods for the stomach and the stomach for foods, but God will destroy both it and them&#8221; (6:12).  Obviously this was being said in the congregation.  It is a blatant denial of the resurrection which Paul counters in verse 13.  Here is where injecting gnostic influences becomes the most tempting.  But we know that for gnostics, salvation does not lie in the temporal world.  Thiselton, however, argues that the Corinthians reinterpreted the resurrection to mean their rebirth as Christians because nowhere does it say that they believed they were already resurrected and would never die.<strong>42</strong> However, this is incorrect in light of the above mentioned slogan.  Why would the Corinthians believe they were reborn (being still in flesh) and their bodies doomed for destruction by God?  Would God initiate a rebirth only to destroy it later?  It is far more reasonable to think that the Corinthians never factored in the body at all&#8211;thus denying a resurrection all together.  There is a something at work here, but it is not gnostic&#8211;it is Platonic and traditional.  In fact, the Corinthians might have been attempting to mix Platonic elements with traditional Greek religion.  Here is where old ideas may have resurfaced in the Corinthian minds that Paul and Apollos failed to efface.</p>
<p>In our section of the pagan spiritual search, we found that most wanted a quick salvation in the present.  This is what made philosophy and the mystery religions so appealing.  The slogan about foods and the stomach sounds very much like a Stoic slogan.  Marcus Aurelius says something similar:</p>
<blockquote><p>In the life of a man, his time is but a moment, his being an incessant flux,<br />
his senses a dim rushlight, his body a prey of worms, his soul an unquiet eddy,<br />
his forces dark, and his fame doubtful.  In short, all that is of the body is as<br />
coursing waters, all that is of the soul as dreams and vapors; life a warfare, a<br />
brief sojourning in an alien land; and after repute, oblivion.<strong>43</strong></p></blockquote>
<p>Marcus Aurelius&#8217; eloquent comments portray the dominant theme of the Roman world&#8211;we live and then we die.  No doubt, the Corinthians felt as he did, and this became their motivation to rule as kings because they denied a resurrection of the body.  But this is not to say that the Corinthians were non-religious; their practice of spiritual gifts is testament to a very strong sense of religiosity, however, with a philosophic flavor.</p>
<p>Even in the days of Plato, or better yet Homer; Greek notions of the after life was not a promising hope for most except the glorious heroes like Achilles, Odysseus, Hector, and Heracles whose soul or &#8220;shade&#8221; would spend eternity in the Elysian Fields.  For the average person, however, an inglorious eternity was to be spent in the underworld roaming aimlessly without true form&#8211;somewhat like a forgotten echo.  Life on the surface, however, was where most could gain everlasting immortality through fame.  The after-life, though, was an after-thought.</p>
<p>Religion thus served its purpose for the living as a celebration of life itself.  It was as much a civic institution as government.  It is highly possible that the Corinthians created for themselves a theocracy (an exstention of the Messianic Kingdom) where they ruled by the oracles of the Holy Spirit.  It has already been established that the pagan spiritual search involved the love of oracles and miracle-workers.  These were not just the proofs of their salvation; the manifestations of the Holy Spirit and their religious freedom became their salvation.  But the Corinthians needed a paradigm to organize their community.  Perhaps Plato&#8217;s Republic was the model of their theocracy, a point worth investigating.</p>
<p>Since we know that Paul was concerned with neither gnostic knowledge or Philonic wisdom, it stands that Greek wisdom in general is what he meant, for he says &#8220;Jews seek a sign, and Greeks seek after wisdom&#8221; (1:22).  Plato, no doubt, was the most popular of the Greek philosophers and the most associated with Greek wisdom.  Even Philo in Alexandria was affected by him over three hundred years after his death.  The Corinthians, being closer to Plato&#8217;s Athens, would have been influenced all the more.  Let us, therefore, investigate Plato&#8217;s analogy of the Divided Line as a clue to the Corinthians&#8217; obsession with knowledge.</p>
<p>The Divided Line analogy expresses a boundary relationship between Plato&#8217;s two realities&#8211;the intelligible realm and the physical realm.<strong>44</strong> As, by now, one can guess for Plato; the intelligible realm is superior to the physical realm.  The two realities are divided into four mental states beginning with two states in the intelligible realm and gradually descending (decaying) into the final two states of the physical realm.    State A is Intelligence (noesis); full vision culminating in truth.<strong>45</strong> State B is Reason; the procedure of mathematical reasoning (dianoia), purely deductive and uncritical of its assumptions.<strong>46</strong> This is the lowest limit of the intelligible realm.  State C is Belief (pistis or faith); commonsense beliefs in morals as a practical guide to life, but not well thought out.<strong>47</strong> Finally we are left with state D which is Illusion (eikasia); second hand impressions and opinions of which the minds of ordinary people are full.<strong>48<br />
</strong></p>
<p>Plato&#8217;s analogy sets up his conclusion that only the best (who understand the intelligible) are capable of ruling (i.e. the famous Philosopher King).  Every person, according to Plato, must know their place and not deceive others with pretenses of greater ability.  The Corinthians&#8217; obsession with knowledge and spiritual maturity are no less statements of knowing the intelligible in line with Platonic thought.  From this it becomes easier to understand why they began to value certain spiritual gifts over others as proof of their intellectual status and as markers of rank.  It also might explain why they were dividing into factions:  1) each group claimed a monopoly on the intelligible truth, and 2)  they wished to align themselves with the true philosopher king whether it be Paul, Apollos, Cephas, or Christ.  This, of course, forces Paul to call himself a fool for Christ because he believes or rather has faith (pistis) in the foolishness of God (1:25).  Paul is thus reversing the Platonic order by valuing something based on faith.  Paul is also content to leave the wisdom of God as a mystery revealed through the Spirit (not mathematical reasoning)(2:10).  This is Paul&#8217;s most powerful theological statement in the whole epistle&#8211;God can work salvation through foolish and weak things which the crucifixion is the epitome.</p>
<p>Is there any credibility to this theory? Plato&#8217;s analogy of the Divided Line is an ancient attempt at perception theory.</p>
<blockquote><p>Paul has a perceptional response in 1 Corinthians 13:8-10:<br />
Love never fails.  But whether there are prophecies, they will fail; whether<br />
there are tongues, they will cease; whether there is knowledge, it will pass<br />
away.  For we know in part and we prophesy in part.  But when that which<br />
is perfect has come, then that which is in part will be done away.</p></blockquote>
<p>Paul is thus saying that it is impossible for human beings to gain access to full knowledge until Christ returns.	Paul also says, &#8220;For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then face to face.  Now I know in part, but then I shall know just as I also am known&#8221; (13:12).  Finally Paul concludes with, &#8220;And now abide faith, hope, love, these three; but the greatest of these is love&#8221; (13:13).  This is the &#8220;more excellent way&#8221; Paul wishes to impart on the Corinthians.  It thus can be seen that Paul supersedes Intelligence and Reason with what would be considered to Greek Philosophy, as the most irrational and erratic force in the universe&#8211;love with its derivatives faith and hope.</p>
<p>Is Paul making an antithetical argument against Plato?  Plato would argue that knowledge is found in the Forms&#8211;Ideas expressed in geometric patterns that define the cosmos and are independent of our minds, and are more sure than the senses which can never be trusted because they only impart &#8220;reflections&#8221; of the true Forms.<strong>49 </strong>Paul admits that we see only reflections of the truth in dark mirrors, but Paul emphatically argues that it is not reasonable to discard with the physical senses that produce faith, hope, and love.  Paul has to argue this because it was out of Christ&#8217;s love that he allowed Himself to be crucified so that we might attain salvation and the fullness (pleroma) of God.  This would entail the future obtainment of all knowledge through the mind of Christ (which Paul says we have only in part now).  Paul, therefore, does seem to be arguing against a version of Platonic philosophy.  Also, we can realistically infer that the Corinthians are attempting to establish a Republic along Platonic lines for the organization of the community.  The factions, therefore, are representative of their search for a philosopher king to rule over them.</p>
<p>Now that we have investigated the possibility of Platonic influences in the Corinthian community, we must also recognize the presence of charismatic utterances and other spiritual gifts as signs of religious practice.  This means that Corinthians were not exclusively utilizing philosophy as the basis of their way of life.  They seem to be balancing their philosophic tendencies with a very vigorous &#8220;enthusiastic&#8221; use of the Spirit.  As we have noted earlier, this enthusiasm is the by-product of an over-realized eschatology of the Corinthian church.  The question remains, and it is our final question to consider, what is the source of their religious practice?</p>
<p>Just as we have seen how traditional philosophic ideas crept into the Corinthian church as an explanation for their concerns with knowledge and wisdom; we find that tradition Greek religion is present as well.  The charismatic utterances employed by the Corinthians through the Holy Spirit became a Christian adaptation to oracular divination as found in such sacred places as Delphi and Eleusis.  Having oracles was the nearest link to the divine realm where the pious might get one step ahead of Fate which, as we noted earlier, was very much a major concern for the ordinary person of the first century.</p>
<p>Adding to the need for oracles, the Corinthians display something not unlike the Greek mystery cult of Dionysus (Bacchus) the god of wine and orgasmic frenzy&#8211;the effects of wine.  Somehow the Corinthians have associated Christ with Dionysus.  It is highly possible the confusion is related to the Lord&#8217;s Supper.  It seems that when the Corinthians gathered for the supper, many became drunk (11:21), and were eating the supper in an unworthy manner (11:27, and 11:29).  These actions (generally any excessive behavior) resemble the mystery rites of Dionysus which are detrimental to the well-being of the oikos or family.<strong>50</strong> For Paul, this behavior was detrimental to the oikos of Christ.<br />
Does Paul hint that the Corinthians were engaging in the Lord&#8217;s Supper as a mystery rite?  We can only find a subtle inference.  Paul exhorts the Corinthians to be &#8220;servants of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God&#8221; (4:1).  They are to do this by imitating him (4:16).  Instead of excessive behaviors, desire to rule, and gaining worldly wisdom; the Corinthians are to be willing to suffer as Paul.  Paul, then, does appear to be defining a new mystery ordained by God and revealed not in wine, oracles, or knowledge, but by the Spirit of God (2:10).</p>
<p>How else does Dionysus fit into the Corinthians&#8217; religious practices?  According to Dowden, Dionysus is the &#8220;arriving god&#8221; who represents the unrestrained forces in nature opposed to civilization and human (Greek) achievement.<strong>51</strong> He becomes an outlet&#8211;a release&#8211;of wild enthusiasm necessary in balancing the rigors of civility.  Dionysus, therefore, is not a contradiction to the Corinthians&#8217; obsession with the pursuit of wisdom and knowledge; but an acceptable outlet of tension, pleasure, and other physical desires that are repressed for the sake of gaining knowledge.  Dionysus is thus replaced with Christ who said He was the new wine, and the branch from which all vines shoot forth.  Furthermore, the death, blood, and resurrection of Christ becomes representative of an oblation poured out for humankind just like how Dionysus (who also represents Spring growth) must die so that winter can set in; and then later be resurrected the next Spring so that vegetation can germinate once again.  Just like Christ, Dionysus represents a rebirth and a renewal.  And Christ, like Dionysus, is an arriving God for He is still to come at the parousia.  The old myths of Dionysus, therefore, are not easily effaced from the minds of the Corinthians especially with so many similarities exhibited by Christ. <!--more--></p>
<p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p>
<p>Our investigation has disproved three things and attempted to offer as two possibilities as better solutions.  We have sufficiently disproved that the Corinthians had a Gnostic system.  We also disproved the notion that Philonic Jewish Hellenism was the source of any gnosticizing or that it was transmitted through the ministry of Apollos.  Finally, we disproved the notion of the Corinthians as proto-gnostics; the forerunners of Gnostic Christianity.  We did, however, offer the possibilities that the Corinthians were experimenting with Platonic philosophy in an attempt to establish a theocracy, while also balancing this with the practice of mystery cultism possibly derived from the cult of Dionysus.  What then emerged in Corinth was the syncretism of philosophy and religion, which is not too surprising since Corinth was a melting pot of cultural ideas in a world where everyone was searching for salvation identity without having to wait for the after-life.   <!--more--></p>
<p><strong>Bibliography</strong></p>
<p>Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, trans.  Maxiwell Staniforth, New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1977.</p>
<p>Raymond Bryan Brown, &#8220;1 Corinthians,&#8221; The Broadman Bible Commentary, V.10, ed. Clifton J. Allen, Nashville:  The Broadman Press, 1970.</p>
<p>Celsus, On the True Doctrine:  A Discourse Against the Christians, trans.  R. Joseph Hoffmann, New York:  Oxford University Press, 1987.</p>
<p>Hans Conzelmann, &#8220;1 Corinthians,&#8221; Hermeneia, trans.  James W. Leitch, Philadelphia:  Fortress Press, 1975.</p>
<p>William G. Doty, &#8220;The Classification of Epistolary Literature,&#8221;  Catholic Biblical Quarterly, V.31, 1969, ed. Joseph Fitzmeyer, Washington D.C:  The Catholic Biblical Association of America.</p>
<p>Ken Dowden, The Uses of Greek Mythology, New York:  Routledge, 1992.</p>
<p>Michael Grant, The World of Rome, New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1960.</p>
<p>Richard A. Horsley, &#8220;Gnosis in Corinth:  1 Corinthians 8:1-6,&#8221; New Testament Studies, V.27, 1980-81, ed. R. Mcl. Wilson, New York:  Cambridge University Press.</p>
<p>Richard A. Horsley, &#8220;How Can Some of You Say that There is no Resurrection of the Dead?:  Spiritual Elitism in Corinth,&#8221; Novum Testamentum, V.20, 1978, ed. W.C. Van Unnik, Leiden, The Netherlands:  E. J. Brill.</p>
<p>Gerard P. Luttikhuizen, &#8220;The Evaluation of the Teaching of Jesus in Christian Gnostic Revelation Dialogues,&#8221; Novem Testamentum, V.30, 1988, ed. C.K. Barrett et. al., Leiden, The Netherlands:  E. J. Brill.</p>
<p>Plato, The Republic, trans.  Sir Desmond Lee, New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1987.</p>
<p>Kurt Rudolph, Gnosis:  The Nature and History of Gnosticism, trans. and ed.  Robert McLachlan Wilson, San Fransico:  HarperCollins Publishers, 1987.</p>
<p>Seneca, Letters From a Stoic, trans. Robin Campbell, New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1969.</p>
<p>Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World, New York:  Oxford University Press, 1965.</p>
<p>Anthony Thiselton, &#8220;Realized Eschatology at Corinth,&#8221; New Testament Studies, V.24, 1978, ed. R. Mcl. Wilson, New York:  Cambridge University Press.</p>
<p><strong>Endnotes</strong></p>
<p>1 Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 604.<br />
2 Actually, more often than not, the period was a time of cross-cultural sharing of old ideas.<br />
3 Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World, p. 604.<br />
4 Michael Grant, The World of Rome, (New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1960), p. 149.<br />
5 Ibid., p. 152.<br />
6 Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World, p. 605.<br />
7 Ibid., pp. 605-606.<br />
8 Seneca, Letters From a Stoic, trans. Robin Campbell, (New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1969), p. 37.  Excerpted from letter V.  Seneca goes on to say that life should be a compromise between the ideal and the popular morality.<br />
9 Raymond Bryan Brown, &#8220;1 Corinthians,&#8221; The Broadman Bible Commentary, V.10, ed. Clifton J. Allen (Nashville:  Broadman Press, 1970), p. 287.<br />
10 Ibid., p. 287.<br />
11 Ibid., p. 291.<br />
12 Ibid., p. 291.<br />
13 Hans Conzelmann, &#8220;1 Corinthians,&#8221; Hermeneia, (Philadelphia:  Fortress Press, 1975), p.13.  The actual dates of Gallio&#8217;s proconsulship are uncertain as is the whole dating of Paul&#8217;s missionary travels.  This is the best working approximation.<br />
14 Chester G. Starr, A History of the Ancient World, p. 607.<br />
15 Richard A. Horsley, &#8220;Gnosis in Corinth:  1 Corinthians 8:1-6,&#8221; New Testament Studies, V.27, (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 34.<br />
16 In Chapters 4, 8, and 9 of Proverbs we see Lady Wisdom as the proper consort of the righteous and wise man.  Philo&#8217;s Sophia is more than a personification; he actually deifies her to the role of divine mediator to humanity and consort of God as an agent in creation.   Christian writers have done something similiar with ascribing &#8220;Logos&#8221; or word to Christ.<br />
17 Richard A. Horsley, &#8220;Gnosis in Corinth 1 Corinthians 8:1-6,&#8221; p. 33.<br />
18 Ibid., p. 34.<br />
19 Ibid., p. 35.<br />
20 Ibid., p. 34.<br />
21 William G. Doty, &#8220;The Classification of Epistolary Literature,&#8221; Catholic Biblical Quarterly, V.31, (Washington D.C:  The Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1969), pp. 183-184.<br />
22 Ibid., p. 193.<br />
23 Paul describes four groups:  1) those who follow him, 2) those who follow Apollos, 3) those who follow Cephas&#8211;which is the Apostle Peter, and 4)  those who simply follow Christ.  Anthony Thiselton says that Paul attacks the Corinthians&#8217; tendency to overvalue certain individual personalities (including himself), and also the danger of undervaluing the ministry as a whole.  Anthony C. Thiselton, &#8220;Realized Eschatology at Corinth,&#8221; New Testament Studies, V.24, (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 513.<br />
24 Note the similarity between how Paul introduces slogans and how Seneca introduces a Stoic motto.  Both state how well known their slogans are.  This is a good example of how freely Stoic and Jewish ideas circulated within the Empire&#8211;enough for them to admit their popularity.  This is also shows that Paul realizes all of the factions were aware of these slogans and could identifiy with their message; whether they be Jew or Greek.<br />
25 Richard A. Horsley, &#8220;Gnosis in Corinth,&#8221; p. 36.<br />
26 Ibid., p. 37.<br />
27 Celsus, On the True Doctrine, trans. R. Joseph Hoffmann, (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 53.<br />
28 He was already teaching accurately from the scriptures from what he knew before Priscilla and Aquila met him.  They probably explained to Apollos that he should also preach to the gentiles like Paul.  They might have also explained about the Holy Spirit to him like Paul did to those in Ephesus, who like Apollos, had only the baptism of John.  It is unlikely that they explained the scriptures to Apollos because he was already &#8220;mighty&#8221; with them.<br />
29 Richard A. Horsley, &#8220;How Can Some of You Say that There is no Resurrection of the Dead?:  Spiritual Elitism in Corinth,&#8221; Novum Testamentum, (Leiden, The Netherlands:  E. J. Brill, 1978), p. 229.<br />
30 Hans Conzelmann, &#8220;1 Corinthians,&#8221; p. 15.<br />
31 Kurt Rudolph, Gnosis:  The Nature and History of Gnosticism, trans.  and ed.  Robert Mclachlan Wilson, (San Fransico:  HarperCollins Publishers, 1987), p. 54.<br />
32 Ibid., p. 54.<br />
33 Ibid., p. 55.<br />
34 Ibid., p. 57.<br />
35 Ibid., p. 58.  Note that light and darkness are euphemisms for good and evil, body and matter for flesh and spirit, and the world with its rulers is the God of creation (the Demiurge); who is inferior to the invisible and incomprehensible true God of the universe and His consort Sophia.  The gnostic thus lives in an antithetical world where he or she is caught in the middle of the titanic struggle of the universal deities.  Gnosis is the key to escaping the Demiurge and reconciliation to the true God.<br />
36 Gerard P. Luttikhuizen, &#8220;The Evaluation of the Teaching of Jesus in Christian Gnostic Revelation Dialogues,&#8221; Novum Testamentum, V.30, ed. C.K. Barrett et. al., (Leiden, The Netherlands:  E. J. Brill, 1988), p. 158.<br />
37Ibid., pp. 160-161.  Yes it is possible that those who aligned themselves with Christ may have been claiming to have received some revelation from the risen Christ from heaven, but in all probability all they knew about Christ was what Paul had explained to them.  Ironically, Paul himself could be viewed as somekind of gnostic because of his revelation on the road to Damascus.  Paul, however, never describes his experience as mystic, but as a more humbling episode in his life that made him appreciate the human Jesus as his Lord.  If Paul were a gnostic, he could never had embraced the cross of Christ&#8211;an act of salvation achieved in the flesh and not the spirit.<br />
38 Anthony C. Thiselton, &#8220;Realized Eschatology at Corinth,&#8221; p. 510.<br />
39 Ibid., p. 510.<br />
40 Ibid., p. 512.  Thiselton is using this argument to explain why the Corinthians overemphasized charismatic utterances&#8211;as necessary proof that they were living in God&#8217;s kingdom.<br />
41 Ibid., p. 523.<br />
42 Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, trans.  Maxwell Staniforth, (New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1977), p. 51.  Though Marcus Aurelius lived much later than our time period here, he is still one of the classic models of a Stoic.<br />
43 Plato, The Republic, trans.  Desmond Lee, (New York:  Penguin Books Ltd., 1987), pp. 309-310.<br />
44 Ibid., p. 311.  For Plato this is achieved by Philosophy.<br />
45 Ibid., p. 311.<br />
46 Ibid., p. 311.<br />
47 Ibid., p. 311.<br />
48 Ibid., p. 264.<br />
49 Ken Dowden, The Uses of Greek Mythology, (New York:  Routledge, 1992) p. 166.<br />
50 Ibid., p. 99.</p>
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		<title>A Review of Manitou and Providence:  Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643</title>
		<link>http://writersofhistory.com/?p=58</link>
		<comments>http://writersofhistory.com/?p=58#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Jul 2010 23:52:49 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Donald Baker</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Colonial American History]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://writersofhistory.com/?p=58</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<!-- cincopa_excerpt_rt = 'full' --><p><!-- 		@page { margin: 0.79in } 		P.sdfootnote { margin-left: 0.2in; text-indent: -0.2in; margin-bottom: 0in; font-size: 10pt } 		P { margin-bottom: 0.08in } 		A.sdfootnoteanc { font-size: 57% } -->The founding and evolution of Colonial New England is a historical topic well covered by Neal Salisbury in his monograph <em>Manitou and Providence:  Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643.</em> Salisbury, a professor of Colonial North America at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, is a specialist in early New England including the pre-Columbian era.  Research fellowships at the Smithsonian Institution and the Newberry Library Center for the History of the American Indian; give Salisbury both the accreditation and prestige necessary for <em>Manitou and Providence</em> to be considered front line scholarship in American Colonial history.</p>
<p><em>Manitou and Providence</em> describes the conquest of New England and the subsequent changes wrought by the incursion of European civilization upon the natives who already inhabited New England.  Salisbury does not retell an already familiar story, but redirects the conversation pertaining to New England’s beginnings from one of “the incompatibility of Indian and English cultures” to one of “interdependent explanations” including the scientific—namely that of disease.<sup><a name="sdfootnote1anc" href="#sdfootnote1sym"><sup>1</sup></a></sup> Salisbury initially tackles the problem of demography in the formation of his thesis.  He notes that past demographic studies have varied tremendously in their findings of Indian populations prior to the arrival of the Europeans.  Salisbury concedes that only estimates can be obtained from these previous studies and so he allots a range of numbers between 126,000 and 144,000 Indians living in pre-epidemic New England based on the ratio of one adult male per 7.5 females and children.<sup><a name="sdfootnote2anc" href="#sdfootnote2sym"><sup>2</sup></a></sup></p>
<p>Having set the baseline population, Salisbury proceeds into economic and technological differences between the Indians and their English counterparts.  According to Salisbury, the southern New England tribes,  were sedentary agriculturalists by the time the English arrived, and therefore, were more economically, politically, and demographically stable than their cousins to the North.<sup><a name="sdfootnote3anc" href="#sdfootnote3sym"><sup>3</sup></a></sup> However, once the southern Algonquian tribes began trading furs with the Europeans for technological upgrades to their tools and weapons, they gradually moved away from their sedentary agriculture in favor of a more interdependent relationship with the English colonists.  This new found symbiotic relationship eventually deteriorated into cultural subordination as disease thinned out the Indian population.<sup><a name="sdfootnote4anc" href="#sdfootnote4sym"><sup>4</sup></a></sup> Furthermore, as disease and technological dependence weakened the Indians’ positional strength with the English, they found themselves the victims of military expansion.</p>
<p>Salisbury also comments on the growing acceptance of Christianity by many of the natives as they acclimated themselves to English “superiority.”  Salisbury writes:</p>
<p><em>The Indians had accepted the superiority of English technology and had already “a little degenerated from some of their lazy customs and show[n] themselves more industrious.”  By the same token, the customary habit of beseeching Hobbamock…when Kiehtan was inaccessible was giving way to an active interest in Christianity.<sup><a name="sdfootnote5anc" href="#sdfootnote5sym"><sup>5</sup></a></sup></em></p>
<p>The Indians perceived the English technological superiority as proof that the English had access to a more powerful god than they.  The Indian notion of <em>Manitou</em> or “spirit” resided in all things that excelled; therefore, the Indians recognized that there must be a <em>Manitou</em> behind the prosperity of the English.  Many Indians, thus, desired access to this new kind of <em>Manitou</em>.</p>
<p>Salisbury’s thesis is, for the most part, well developed and devoid of fruitless conjecture.  His economic, demographic, and political explanations of how the English came to dominate New England carry much weight.  It seems though at times Salisbury feels he needs to be apologetic for Indian actions, reactions, and rationale.  It is often that he wishes to convey the settlers as the aggressors, antagonists, and malefactors.  It is often overlooked that the Indians were seizing land from among themselves long before the Europeans began seizing it from them.  Micmacs, Mohawks, Mohegans, Iroquois, and Narrangansetts were vying for hegemony in New England before the <em>Mayflower</em> ever anchored in Massachusetts Bay.   <em>Manitou and Providence</em>, therefore, retains the double quality of being a thorough work of scholarship, but at the same time, borders on the edge of polemic against such things as inequality, discrimination, and European ethnocentrism.  In History, there will always be winners and losers.  The rightness or wrongness in historical events is not for the historian to decide.  Yet, Neal Salisbury may be pardoned since he has excelled in his research above most in his field.</p>
<div id="sdfootnote1">
<p><strong>Footnotes</strong></p>
<p><a name="sdfootnote1sym" href="#sdfootnote1anc">1</a> Neal Salisbury, <em>Manitou and Providence:  Indians, Europeans, and 	the Making of New England, 1500-1643</em> (New York:  Oxford 	University Press, 1982), 3-7.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote2">
<p><a name="sdfootnote2sym" href="#sdfootnote2anc">2</a> Ibid., 25-27.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote3">
<p><a name="sdfootnote3sym" href="#sdfootnote3anc">3</a> Ibid., 30-33.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote4">
<p><a name="sdfootnote4sym" href="#sdfootnote4anc">4</a> Ibid., 33-39.  Salisbury notes that the religious lives of the 	Algonquians changed as their dependence on Europeans increased.  The 	Indians once used religion to deter excessive killing of game, but 	economic pressures forced them to neglect the old rituals, even to 	the point that some rituals were even forgotten all together.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote5">
<p><a name="sdfootnote5sym" href="#sdfootnote5anc">5</a> Ibid., 188.</p>
</div>
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><!-- 		@page { margin: 0.79in } 		P.sdfootnote { margin-left: 0.2in; text-indent: -0.2in; margin-bottom: 0in; font-size: 10pt } 		P { margin-bottom: 0.08in } 		A.sdfootnoteanc { font-size: 57% } -->The founding and evolution of Colonial New England is a historical topic well covered by Neal Salisbury in his monograph <em>Manitou and Providence:  Indians, Europeans, and the Making of New England, 1500-1643.</em> Salisbury, a professor of Colonial North America at Smith College in Northampton, Massachusetts, is a specialist in early New England including the pre-Columbian era.  Research fellowships at the Smithsonian Institution and the Newberry Library Center for the History of the American Indian; give Salisbury both the accreditation and prestige necessary for <em>Manitou and Providence</em> to be considered front line scholarship in American Colonial history.</p>
<p><em>Manitou and Providence</em> describes the conquest of New England and the subsequent changes wrought by the incursion of European civilization upon the natives who already inhabited New England.  Salisbury does not retell an already familiar story, but redirects the conversation pertaining to New England’s beginnings from one of “the incompatibility of Indian and English cultures” to one of “interdependent explanations” including the scientific—namely that of disease.<sup><a name="sdfootnote1anc" href="#sdfootnote1sym"><sup>1</sup></a></sup> Salisbury initially tackles the problem of demography in the formation of his thesis.  He notes that past demographic studies have varied tremendously in their findings of Indian populations prior to the arrival of the Europeans.  Salisbury concedes that only estimates can be obtained from these previous studies and so he allots a range of numbers between 126,000 and 144,000 Indians living in pre-epidemic New England based on the ratio of one adult male per 7.5 females and children.<sup><a name="sdfootnote2anc" href="#sdfootnote2sym"><sup>2</sup></a></sup></p>
<p>Having set the baseline population, Salisbury proceeds into economic and technological differences between the Indians and their English counterparts.  According to Salisbury, the southern New England tribes,  were sedentary agriculturalists by the time the English arrived, and therefore, were more economically, politically, and demographically stable than their cousins to the North.<sup><a name="sdfootnote3anc" href="#sdfootnote3sym"><sup>3</sup></a></sup> However, once the southern Algonquian tribes began trading furs with the Europeans for technological upgrades to their tools and weapons, they gradually moved away from their sedentary agriculture in favor of a more interdependent relationship with the English colonists.  This new found symbiotic relationship eventually deteriorated into cultural subordination as disease thinned out the Indian population.<sup><a name="sdfootnote4anc" href="#sdfootnote4sym"><sup>4</sup></a></sup> Furthermore, as disease and technological dependence weakened the Indians’ positional strength with the English, they found themselves the victims of military expansion.</p>
<p>Salisbury also comments on the growing acceptance of Christianity by many of the natives as they acclimated themselves to English “superiority.”  Salisbury writes:</p>
<p><em>The Indians had accepted the superiority of English technology and had already “a little degenerated from some of their lazy customs and show[n] themselves more industrious.”  By the same token, the customary habit of beseeching Hobbamock…when Kiehtan was inaccessible was giving way to an active interest in Christianity.<sup><a name="sdfootnote5anc" href="#sdfootnote5sym"><sup>5</sup></a></sup></em></p>
<p>The Indians perceived the English technological superiority as proof that the English had access to a more powerful god than they.  The Indian notion of <em>Manitou</em> or “spirit” resided in all things that excelled; therefore, the Indians recognized that there must be a <em>Manitou</em> behind the prosperity of the English.  Many Indians, thus, desired access to this new kind of <em>Manitou</em>.</p>
<p>Salisbury’s thesis is, for the most part, well developed and devoid of fruitless conjecture.  His economic, demographic, and political explanations of how the English came to dominate New England carry much weight.  It seems though at times Salisbury feels he needs to be apologetic for Indian actions, reactions, and rationale.  It is often that he wishes to convey the settlers as the aggressors, antagonists, and malefactors.  It is often overlooked that the Indians were seizing land from among themselves long before the Europeans began seizing it from them.  Micmacs, Mohawks, Mohegans, Iroquois, and Narrangansetts were vying for hegemony in New England before the <em>Mayflower</em> ever anchored in Massachusetts Bay.   <em>Manitou and Providence</em>, therefore, retains the double quality of being a thorough work of scholarship, but at the same time, borders on the edge of polemic against such things as inequality, discrimination, and European ethnocentrism.  In History, there will always be winners and losers.  The rightness or wrongness in historical events is not for the historian to decide.  Yet, Neal Salisbury may be pardoned since he has excelled in his research above most in his field.</p>
<div id="sdfootnote1">
<p><strong>Footnotes</strong></p>
<p><a name="sdfootnote1sym" href="#sdfootnote1anc">1</a> Neal Salisbury, <em>Manitou and Providence:  Indians, Europeans, and 	the Making of New England, 1500-1643</em> (New York:  Oxford 	University Press, 1982), 3-7.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote2">
<p><a name="sdfootnote2sym" href="#sdfootnote2anc">2</a> Ibid., 25-27.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote3">
<p><a name="sdfootnote3sym" href="#sdfootnote3anc">3</a> Ibid., 30-33.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote4">
<p><a name="sdfootnote4sym" href="#sdfootnote4anc">4</a> Ibid., 33-39.  Salisbury notes that the religious lives of the 	Algonquians changed as their dependence on Europeans increased.  The 	Indians once used religion to deter excessive killing of game, but 	economic pressures forced them to neglect the old rituals, even to 	the point that some rituals were even forgotten all together.</p>
</div>
<div id="sdfootnote5">
<p><a name="sdfootnote5sym" href="#sdfootnote5anc">5</a> Ibid., 188.</p>
</div>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Operation Mars</title>
		<link>http://writersofhistory.com/?p=45</link>
		<comments>http://writersofhistory.com/?p=45#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 27 Jul 2010 23:54:44 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Donald Baker</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[World War II History]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://writersofhistory.com/?p=45</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[<!-- cincopa_excerpt_rt = 'full' --><div><span style="font-size: small;">Operation MARS</span></div>
<div>By <strong>Michael Harbert<br />
</strong></div>
<div><span style="font-size: x-small;"> The German operational mindset at the beginning of the 1942 campaigning<br />
season was based on the belief that the Soviets were incapable of developing and<br />
implementing a major coherent offensive operation of a scale and depth that could<br />
threaten Wehrmacht operations beyond the local level.1 This belief was reinforced by the<br />
early successes of Operation BLAU in the south, where German advances were swift and<br />
Soviet positions were encircled in depth, but yielded only a fraction of the prisoners that<br />
similar actions yielded only a year earlier. In fact, the Soviets were fighting a new style<br />
of staged withdrawal defensive operations up until Stalin’s .Not One Step Back. order of<br />
late 28 July 1942 (Order 227).2 The resulting drive toward the Volga and into the<br />
Caucuses consumed much of the Wehrmacht’s focus and offensive power.</p>
<p>The Soviet operational mindset in 1942 was focused initially on the defense of<br />
Moscow. Their December 1941 counter-offensives had left the front west of Moscow<br />
jagged and irregular, with the Germans still firmly lodged in a large salient in the region<br />
around Belyi, Rzhev, Sychevka and Viaz’ma and a smaller salient around Demyansk,<br />
both of which were seen as potential launching points for a renewed offensive aimed at<br />
Moscow (see Map 1). As a result, Soviet forces and reserves were concentrated to meet<br />
and renewed German thrust toward the Soviet capital. It was this concentration of<br />
German forces – the Ninth Army – that was to preoccupy the mind of Soviet Marshal<br />
Georgy Zhukov.</p>
<p>Zhukov had a personal stake in the fate of the Ninth Army and Army Group<br />
Center. He had engineered the 1941 winter offensive directed against Army Group<br />
Center that saved Moscow. While this was the first successful offensive of the war for</p>
<p><img src="http://www.writersofhistory.com/uploadfiles/mars_map.png" alt="" width="529" height="952" /><br />
Map 1- Situation on the Eastern Front when planning for Operations MARS and URANUS</p>
<p>(Map from David M. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat,</p>
<p>the Soviets, it fell short of Zhukov’s goal: the destruction of Army Group Center. He had<br />
planned large and while he was successful at ending the immediate threat to Moscow, he<br />
fell short of his own lofty goals. As a result, became fixated on completing the<br />
destruction of Army Group Center.</p>
<p><strong>SITUATION ACROSS THE FRONT </strong></p>
<p>German operations in the summer of 1942 were focused on Operation BLUE<br />
(BLAU) in the south. Hitler’s drive toward Stalingrad and into the Caucuses took<br />
priority for men, munitions, materiel, and equipment – and it met with a rousing success<br />
at first. But it was not the only offensive operation for the Wehrmacht on the eastern<br />
front.</p>
<p>After the fall of the Crimea, Hitler had more ambitions plans than just the<br />
launching of a major offensive in the south. Manstein’s 11th Army and the Sevastopol<br />
siege forces were ordered north to add their weight to the siege of Leningrad in Operation<br />
NORTHERN LIGHT. Any hope of future German operations in the north depended<br />
upon the fall of Leningrad and this operation was to be conducted despite the demand for<br />
additional forces in the south. Hitler’s grand ambitions were derailed as soon as the 11th<br />
Army arrived in the north, because the Volkhov front of General Meretskov launched an<br />
assault to relieve the besieged Soviet forces in Leningrad in late August. Meretskov’s<br />
initial successes were so great that those forces from the Crimea allocated for<br />
NORTHERN LIGHT were immediately committed to combat to stop Meretskov’s<br />
advance as soon as they arrived in theater. By the end of September, the Volkhov front’s<br />
offensive was stopped, but the offensive power of the reinforced Army Group North was<br />
also spent.3</p>
<p>In Army Group Center’s area of operations, only limited offensives were<br />
conducted in early 1942, usually with the intent of straightening defensive lines or<br />
increasing the security of their positions. The largest operation launched by Army Group<br />
Center was to widen and secure the corridor that reached out to the Demyansk pocket.<br />
Hitler had refused to allow evacuation of this tenuous position, so its link with the rest of<br />
Army Group Center had to be secured.</p>
<p>While Hitler had great plans for his southern offensive, the German Army was<br />
hardly in a position to conduct sustained offensive operations on a broad front. The<br />
demand for forces and supplies to fuel the offensive drained strength from across the<br />
front. In the spring of 1942, before the launch of BLAU, the infantry divisions of Army<br />
Group South were only at about 50% of their authorized strength. An OKW study<br />
released in May 1942 reported that the 225 divisions in Russia were collectively some<br />
625,000 men short of their authorized strength.4 In order to build up the divisions needed<br />
for Army Group South’s offensive, sixty-nine of the divisions of Army Groups North and<br />
Center were reduced in size from nine authorized battalions to six.5 While Hitler could<br />
have freed up German troops by authorizing his Army Group commanders to conduct<br />
local withdrawals to shorten and straighten their lines – including the abandonment of the<br />
Demyansk and Rzhev salients – he was fixated on never giving up conquered Soviet<br />
territory. So, as a result, as Sixth Army (now under Army Group A) advanced on<br />
Stalingrad, its extended flanks were turned over to the Axis allies, mainly Romanians.</p>
<p>Another step taken to fill the gaps needed for personnel on the eastern front was<br />
the creation of Luftwaffe field divisions. Tens of thousands of Luftwaffe personnel –<br />
men and officers – were organized as infantry units and committed to the front lines<br />
without appropriate infantry training. Inter-service rivalries and monumental egos<br />
prevented these men from being re-assigned and incorporated into infantry units where<br />
their effectiveness could have been assured. As it was, by summer and fall of 1942<br />
infantry replacements were undergoing a mere two months of training before arriving at<br />
the front.6 The result was that from Leningrad to the Caucuses, the German lines were<br />
stretched thin and undermanned. As it was, by the end of October 1942, German forces in<br />
the east were short some 300,000 replacements.7 Hitler’s .Operations Order 1. of 14<br />
October 1942 stressed a commitment to a linear defense in defensive zones across the<br />
entire front. He specifically shunned the .elastic defense. developed after 1916 and<br />
apparently envisioned World War I western front style trenches reaching across the entire<br />
front.8 The result was under strength units stretched thin, frequently ensconced in strong<br />
points simply out of necessity, and without adequate local reserves.</p>
<p><strong>SOVIET PLANS </strong></p>
<p>From early 1942, Stavka could not come to a consensus on where best to plan<br />
their pending offensives. Zhukov argued to strike at the German forces in the Rzhev<br />
salient, renewing the winter offensive and finishing the job of destroying Army Group<br />
Center. Colonel General Aleksandr Vasilevsky (Chief of the General Staff) and Marshal<br />
Boris Shaposhnikov argued for a strategic defensive across the entire front to allow the<br />
Germans to expend the bulk of their combat power before launching an offensive (a<br />
philosophy that was finally adopted a year later). Stalin finally agreed to the plan offered<br />
by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, to launch a limited pre-emptive offensive in the south<br />
against the German forces around Khar’kov.9</p>
<p>The Khar’kov offensive was soundly defeated and led to the launch the German<br />
offensive in the south. Zhukov, however, remained fixated on the Germans in the Rzhev<br />
salient, and in late July – while Paulus’ Sixth Army was driving on Stalingrad – he<br />
launched a limited offensive against Model’s Ninth Army in what became known as the<br />
Pogoreloe – Gorodische offensive. While this battle stretched into early September, it<br />
failed to achieve any significant goals. It did, however inflict severe casualties on Army<br />
Group Center, and gave Zhukov an indication of what a coordinated offensive across the<br />
entire salient could accomplish, but it came at a high price for the Soviets.</p>
<p>Throughout the spring and summer of 1942, the Soviets continued to build up<br />
reserve forces around Moscow at a rapid rate. Even though German intelligence saw this<br />
build up, they did not believe these forces capable of mounting a major offensive. In<br />
reality, the Soviets were not only planning a major offensive operation aimed at<br />
encircling a large portion of German forces in the south, they were actually planning two<br />
such operations. Zhukov and Vasilevsky began planning their winter offensives on 12<br />
September 1942.10 Although the details and timelines changed frequently, they<br />
envisioned launching two mutually supported major offensives &#8211; one in the south and one<br />
in central / western front. The amassing of Soviet reserves allowed them to realistically<br />
plan on such a grand scale. The overall plan called for Vasilevsky to lead the offensive in<br />
the south, Operation URANUS, aimed at the encirclement of the German Sixth Army in<br />
Stalingrad while Zhukov would lead the offensive against the Rzhev salient with the goal<br />
of encircling and destroying the German Ninth Army, Operation MARS. Both<br />
operations, if successful, were to be followed by even deeper encirclements designed for<br />
the destruction of German forces in the Caucuses (SATURN) and Army Group Center<br />
(JUPITER).</p>
<p>The concept behind combining Operations URANUS and MARS was to fix the<br />
German reserves in place where they would not be able to influence either battle.<br />
Initially, it was thought that both offensives would be launched simultaneously, forcing<br />
the Germans to either split their reserve forces or commit them to one area while almost<br />
assuring a resounding Soviet victory in the other sector. After several logistical and<br />
weather related delays, it was decided that Operation MARS would commence six days<br />
after URANUS was launched. The hope was that the Germans would dispatch their<br />
armored reserves toward the south, and before they could reach the battle they would<br />
have to be recalled to counter the advances threatening Army Group Center. In this<br />
manner, due to the distances involved, the reserves would not be able to have a<br />
significant impact on either battle.</p>
<p><strong>OPERATION URANUS </strong></p>
<p>The offensive plan of Operation URANUS is well known and thoroughly<br />
documented in histories of the war on the eastern front. Conceived and planned by both<br />
Zhukov and Vasilevsky – with many of the operational details left to Southwestern front<br />
commander Colonel General N.F. Vatutin, the operational plan called for a double<br />
envelopment deep in Sixth Army’s rear. The attack from the north was to be conducted<br />
Vatutin’s Southwestern front (5th Tank and 21st Armies) reinforced with the 65th Army<br />
from Rokossovsky’s Don front, while the attack from the south was to be conducted by<br />
elements of Colonel General A.I. Yeremenko’s Stalingrad front (51st and 57th Armies<br />
with 13th Tank and 4th Mechanized Corps) while the 62nd Army held Sixth Army’s<br />
attention in the city.11 It was to be a classic penetration by infantry and exploitation by<br />
armored and mechanized forces. The two pincers were to meet in the vicinity of the<br />
village of Kalach southwest of Stalingrad. Because the 5th Tank Army (Romanenko) of<br />
Vatutin’s northern pincer had about 30 kilometers further to travel to the proposed link up<br />
site, Yeremenko’s offensive was to be launched 24 hours later.</p>
<p>Based on Soviet intelligence reports and prisoner interrogations, it was decided<br />
that the URANUS assaults would be launched the 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies guarding<br />
the flanks of the German advance on Stalingrad. Under-equipped, without adequate anti-<br />
tank weapons, and suffering from poor morale, the Romanian forces were the ideal<br />
location to strike. Hitler’s paranoia and micromanagement had cowed his Army<br />
commanders to silent acquiescence, forcing them to focus internally rather than on the<br />
enemy situation. Those commanders who refused to be micromanaged or who objected<br />
too vociferously were relieved of their commands; Field Marshal Wilhelm List of Army<br />
Group A was relieved in September 1942.12 As a result, Hitler’s involvement in the<br />
tactical level of operations in the south prevented commanders from taking necessary<br />
defensive precautions, robbed them of initiative, and left them indecisive when the<br />
Soviets attacked.</p>
<p>The offensive in the south was launched on 19 November, with Yeremenko’s<br />
forces attacking on the 20th and met with immediate success. With overwhelming local<br />
superiority of forces and almost complete surprise, the Soviet breakthrough proceeded<br />
almost according to plan. The attack was opened with fires from some 3500 Soviet<br />
artillery and mortar tubes concentrated on a small front paved the way for twelve infantry<br />
divisions, three tank corps, and two cavalry corps.13 Without adequate anti-tank assets,<br />
the Romanians didn’t stand a chance. Although they were quickly condemned by their<br />
German counterparts, it wasn’t many days later when these same German units ran in the<br />
face of the advancing Soviet armor when they also lacked sufficient anti-tank weapons.<br />
Bypassing centers of resistance, the exploitation forces of the 5th Tank Army gained up to<br />
70 kilometers a day and netted over 27,000 prisoners.14 The situation developed so<br />
rapidly that the Germans were unable to react quickly enough to mount an effective<br />
counterattack or defensive. The pincers of the Southwestern front and the Stalingrad<br />
front linked up near Sovetskoe, just southeast of Kalach, completing the encirclement of<br />
the Axis forces in Stalingrad. By the end of November, the Soviets had trapped about<br />
330,000 German and Romanian soldiers from some 22 divisions in the Stalingrad area,<br />
including the Sixth Army, one corps of the 4th Panzer Army, and elements of both the 3rd<br />
and 4th Romanian Armies.15</p>
<p><strong>OPERATION MARS</strong></p>
<p>The attack against the Rzhev salient was to be conducted by the Western front of<br />
Colonel General I.S. Konev (20th, 30th, 31st, and 29th Armies) and the Kalinin front of<br />
Army General M.A. Purkaev (41st Army, 22nd Army, and 39th Army). Stavka allotted<br />
significant forces to this offensive, including 31 tank brigades, 12 tank regiments<br />
(totaling 2352 tanks); 54 artillery regiments, 30 Guards mortar battalions, and 23 anti-<br />
tank regiments (almost 10,000 guns and howitzers); and 20 separate engineer and sapper<br />
battalions.16 Zhukov took much more of a personal interest in the planning of Operation<br />
MARS, leaving many of the details of URANUS to Vasilevsky and Vatutin. The overall<br />
concept for MARS was similar in concept to URANUS. It involved pincer attacks<br />
launched by the 20th Army of Konev’s Western front across the Vazusa river north of<br />
Sychevka and the 22nd and 41st Armies of Purkaev’s Kalinin front across the shoulders of<br />
the salient, with a goal of penetrating the German lines and linking up to complete the<br />
encirclement of the Ninth Army (See Map 2). Supporting attacks would be launched by<br />
the 39th Army of Purkaev’s front on the northern .nose. of the salient and the 30th Army<br />
of Konev’s front west of Rzhev. Once the two pincers linked up, they would turn north<br />
to destroy the Ninth Army.</p>
<p>Zhukov’s plan was basically a series of simultaneous frontal assaults across the<br />
entire Rzhev salient. The main effort centered on the 20th Army attacking from the east<br />
across the Vazusa River north of Sychevka and the 41st Army attacking from the west,<br />
south of Belyi. The 22nd Army’s attack up the Luchesa River valley was designed to cut<br />
the main road linking the German defenders in Belyi with potential reinforcements<br />
coming from Olenino to the northeast. The attacks of the 30th and 39th Armies were<br />
primarily to fix German reserves in place and pressure all German forces in order to<br />
prevent them from helping counter the main thrusts. An assault was also launched by the<br />
3rd Shock Army of the Kalinin front against the German positions at Velikie Luki, some<br />
100 kilometers west of the attacks on Belyi and the Luchesa River valley. Originally,<br />
Stavka planned the MARS attack for 12 October, but bad weather and poor roads delayed<br />
preparations.17</p>
<p><img src="http://www.writersofhistory.com/uploadfiles/mars_map2.png" alt="" width="537" height="308" /></p>
<p>Map 2 – The Rzhev salient and scheme of maneuver for Operation MARS</p>
<p>German intelligence was aware of the Soviet build up and pending offensive.<br />
Basically, Ninth Army and Army Group Center knew that a major offensive was coming<br />
against the Rzhev salient, but they did not know exactly where or when.18 Even though<br />
Soviet deception operations and communications discipline had greatly improved through<br />
the summer of 1942, it was impossible to disguise all of the signs of a major troop build<br />
up. Field Marshal Guenther von Kluge, commander of Army Group Center, was<br />
perplexed and disturbed by the situation forming on the eastern front, especially after the<br />
launch of the Soviet offensive in the south. Throughout the spring of 1942, he had seen<br />
the build up of Soviet forces opposite of his Army Group, and this had opened the door<br />
for the German offensive in the south. Throughout the summer, he had continued to read<br />
intelligence reports that indicated that Soviet forces continued to build up in his region.<br />
Once Operation URANUS was launched, he resisted OKH’s suggestions that he release<br />
or shift his reserve forces to the south because he believed that the Soviet attack there was<br />
a secondary attack or diversion because intelligence showed that Zhukov was not present<br />
there. Instead, Zhukov was commanding forces opposite Army Group Center, and von<br />
Kluge believed that the main effort would fall under Zhukov.19</p>
<p>Operation MARS was launched on 25 November, six days after URANUS was<br />
launched in the south. To the west, where the 41st Army under Major General G.F.<br />
Tarasov was to attack south of Belyi, confidence was running high. Soviet intelligence<br />
had determined that at least half of the lines south of Belyi were occupied by the 2nd<br />
Luftwaffe Field Division, which Tarasov referred to as .Army Group Center’s<br />
Romanians..20 On the opposite side of the salient, confidence was running high as well,<br />
but circumstances conspired to complicate the attack. Even though the assault fell upon<br />
the 5th Panzer Division while it was being relieved in place by the 78th Infantry Division<br />
along the Vazusa River, the German positions mostly held. Snow was falling at a rate of<br />
about one inch an hour with low hanging clouds, which limited observation necessary to<br />
adjust preplanned artillery fires and precluded the employment of Soviet air power. The<br />
result was that much of the massed Soviet preparatory fires were ineffective and many<br />
German defensive strong points were left unscathed.</p>
<p>The Ninth Army had anticipated a renewed Soviet attack ever since the August<br />
offensive around Pogoreloe – Gorodische had ended. General Walter Model, commander<br />
of the Ninth Army had not squandered the opportunity presented by the lull of September<br />
and October. During that time, not only were front line defensive positions improved and<br />
obstacles erected, but he also directed that forests be cleared from the edges of the main<br />
roads inside the salient. Trees were cut out to one to two kilometers from the edge of the<br />
road. This served two purposes; first, it cleared fields of fire for his panzer reserves, and<br />
second, it opened and improved his interior lines of communications and gave his mobile<br />
reserves room to maneuver.21 Also, as described above, Hitler’s .Operations Order 1. of<br />
October 1942 decreed that German forces were to employ a linear defense across the<br />
whole of the defensive front. While he expressly forbade employment of the .elastic<br />
defense. he expressly stressed that .… every Stützpunkt (strongpoint) was to be defended<br />
to the last..22 It appears that Model complied with the spirit of Hitler’s order, but not<br />
necessarily the letter. The defensive front of the Rzhev salient could generally be<br />
described as a series of strongpoints mostly connected by communications trenches.<br />
These strongpoints, usually in company or battalion size, were built around villages and<br />
stone houses. In the ensuing attack, many of these strongpoints survived the Soviet<br />
preplanned artillery fires and were bypassed by the lead echelons of the attack.
</p>
<p></span><span style="font-size: x-small;"><strong>SITUATION ON THE EASTERN FLANK OF THE SALIENT<br />
</strong><br />
The 20th Army’s assault across the frozen Vazusa River was lead by Soviet<br />
punishment battalions and sappers sent forward to clear mines and obstacles. In many<br />
cases, the soldiers of the punishment units advanced forward until they came under fire<br />
and then took to ground, halting the forward progress of the assault. Infantry from the<br />
main assault units arrived at the river just in time to be met by concentrated German<br />
artillery fire. Like most rivers in that part of Russia, the western banks of the Vazusa<br />
were higher than those of the eastern shore, which made for a more formidable defensive<br />
line. Soviet assault divisions were met by heavy fire and a determined German<br />
resistance. The result was heavy Soviet casualties and no penetrations. The only success<br />
by the Soviet 20th Army came in center of their attack zone. The narrow bridgehead and<br />
breakthrough was by mid-day the only opportunity for the cavalry-mechanized and tank<br />
exploitation forces advance into the German rear toward their primary objectives; the<br />
Rzhev-Sychevka railroad.</p>
<p>With the other beachheads across the Vazusa largely contained, Konev adjusted<br />
his original plan and shifted mechanized and armored forces to take advantage the<br />
establishment of this bridgehead. The Soviet 6th Tank Corps was to be the primary<br />
exploitation force. Konev ordered them to shift south, cross the Vazusa that night and<br />
assist the infantry divisions across the river in punching through the final German<br />
positions. Additional infantry was needed to support this breakthrough, so one division<br />
and two brigades of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps ordered forward to support this<br />
breakthrough, as were elements of General V.V. Kriukov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps.<br />
These forces were to be followed by 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division and the 31st<br />
Tank Brigade. The 251st Rifle Division was also directed to enter the bridgehead and<br />
expand the penetration to the north and west.23 The result, as can be imagined, was a<br />
considerable traffic jam. The roads leading to the bridgehead were limited and under a<br />
layer of fresh snow. Soviet communications were strained, and German artillery fire<br />
crashed down on suspected assembly areas. Konev’s handling of the situation reveals a<br />
desperate grasping for success, trying to send too many forces through too narrow a<br />
bridgehead in too short of a time.</p>
<p>Although elements of the 6th Tank Corps were able to break through into the<br />
German rear and even cut the Rzhev-Sychevka railroad, the required follow on infantry,<br />
mechanized, and logistical forces were unable to follow. When the German reserves in<br />
the area, the 9th Panzer Division, moved in to block the Rzhev-Sychevka railroad, the<br />
elements of the 6th Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps that had crossed the<br />
railroad were cut off. Owing to the small size of the Vazusa bridgehead and the confused<br />
congestion of units trying to cross the river, the Soviet artillery had been unable to<br />
displace across the river. The result was the much of the 6th Tank Corps was out of range<br />
of the supporting artillery. By the end of the day on November 26th, the 6th Tank Corps<br />
had lost approximately 50% of its tanks and men, and most of its fuel and ammunition.24</p>
<p>The German defensive line on the shoulders of the Vazusa bridgehead held fast<br />
for several days centered on strongpoints in the villages of Nikonova and Gredianko.<br />
The Soviets paid an extremely heavy price trying to take these villages, and eventually<br />
expended the bulk of their offensive combat power taking them. Wherever the Soviets<br />
were able to take a German strongpoint, a quick local counterattack frequently took the<br />
village back. The result was that no matter how far Soviet armor penetrated, German<br />
strongpoints continued to operate in their rear, preventing the movement of infantry and<br />
necessary logistics.</p>
<p>Confusion at the Vazusa bridgehead disrupted the assault plan, prevented the<br />
displacement and effective employment of Soviet artillery, and kept needed logistical<br />
support from getting to the units that needed it. The result was that the 6th Tank Corps sat<br />
immobile awaiting relief while the Germans assembled combat groups (Kampfgruppe)<br />
plug gaps and counterattack at key points. No matter where the Soviets advanced on the<br />
eastern face of the salient, the Germans were able to react effectively. They formed<br />
reserve units from .clerks and bottle washers. and whoever else was available.25 It was a<br />
close fought battle, but sound and timely decisions by the Germans (and a lack of the<br />
same on part of the Soviets) turned the tide in favor of the Wehrmacht. Across this<br />
section of the battle, the Soviets suffered huge casualties for very little gain. The assault<br />
lost momentum and eventually halted primarily due to Soviet units spending their combat<br />
power so rapidly.</p>
<p>The elements of the 6th Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps trapped<br />
west of the Rzhev-Sychevka road, low on fuel and ammunition, attempted a breakout<br />
back to the Vazusa bridgehead on the night of November 29th. In another close fought<br />
battle, they succeeded in breaking out and reaching Soviet positions in the bridgehead,<br />
but they lost almost all of their vehicles and heavy equipment and again suffered<br />
tremendous casualties.</p>
<p>In early December, the 22nd Army was reinforced by the 5th Tank Corps and<br />
elements of the Stavka reserve reinforced the 29th Army in order to renew the assault<br />
across the Vazusa. On 11 December, in a desperate gamble to try and salvage some<br />
success for Operation MARS, especially in the shadow of the rousing victory of<br />
Vasilevsky’s forces to the south, Zhukov renewed the assault against the recently<br />
reinforce German positions. The result was four more days of costly close quarters<br />
combat. By the end of the day on December 12th, 20th Army had lost an additional 200<br />
tanks to the German anti-tank defenses. The 5th Tank Corps was committed to the fight<br />
that same day, and by December 15th it too was spent.26</p>
<p></span><span style="font-size: x-small;"><strong>SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FLANK OF THE SALIENT<br />
</strong><br />
The primary focus of the assault on the western flank of the salient was Major<br />
General G.F. Tarasov’s 41st Army’s attack south of Belyi. Attacking mainly against the<br />
2nd Luftwaffe Field Division, his army made significant gains on the first day. Snow was<br />
not falling so visibility was considerably better than in 20th Army’s zone on the Vazusa.<br />
The result was that the artillery preparation fires were much more effective, and the<br />
advance rolled through two Luftwaffe regiments and a regiment of the 246th Infantry<br />
Division. The primary objective of the 41st Army’s assault forces was to reach the Nacha<br />
River and cut the roads leading southeast from Belyi. The Soviet belief was that if they<br />
could cut these roads that reinforcements could not reach the Germans at Belyi and the<br />
position would fall.</p>
<p>Colonel General Joseph Harpe, commander of the XXXXI Panzer Corps<br />
defending in that sector, saw Belyi as the key to holding the Rzhev salient. So he decided<br />
to focus primarily on holding Belyi and placing blocking positions along the Nacha River<br />
to prevent the Soviets from using it as an approach on the rear of his forces. Utilizing his<br />
reserves, mainly the Grossdeutschland Motorized Rifle Division and the 1st Panzer<br />
Division, Harpe developed kampfgruppes to establish blocking positions and to launch<br />
counterattacks to regain lost German positions. Again the German defenses were<br />
anchored on a series of strongpoints built on villages. Fighting was generally conducted<br />
at close range, which removed many of the advantages of the Soviet armor. Many Soviet<br />
tanks were lost to anti-tank mines and German infantry using explosives and grenade<br />
bundles.27 General Harpe’s battle involved rushing his limited reserves from one critical<br />
battle to another, trying desperately to hold on until Army Group Center’s reserves, the<br />
XXX Corps could arrive. By the end of the day on November 26th, the Soviets had<br />
penetrated on a front 15-20 kilometers wide and 30-40 kilometers deep in the area south<br />
of Belyi.28 Harpe’s forces were able to hold on by knowing where to ignore Soviet<br />
advances and where to concentrate their defenses and local counterattacks.</p>
<p>The Soviet’s other attempt to cut off the Germans in Belyi came in the 22nd<br />
Army’s thrust up the Luchesa River valley north of Belyi. The terrain in the valley<br />
canalized the Soviet assault and limited their ability to maneuver. It also allowed the<br />
limited German defenders to effectively employ minefields and conduct close range<br />
infantry ambushes. This style of close forest fighting consumed fuel and ammunition at<br />
an alarming rate, and bypassed German troops further hindered Soviet re-supply efforts.<br />
Even so, it was a very closely fought battle until the arrival of reserves from the<br />
Grossdeutschland Motorized Division’s Grenadier Regiment, which had to split its forces<br />
between fending off Soviet advances up the Luchesa River valley and in the north near<br />
the village of Molodoi-Tud. The Soviet advances both north and south of Belyi gained<br />
significant territory, but failed to cut off or destroy the German positions in and around<br />
Belyi and came at a very heavy price. Like the attacks across the Vazusa River, the<br />
Soviet forces involved in the key attacks around Belyi and on the Nacha River suffered<br />
around fifty-percent losses and the attacks ran out of steam due to expenditure of combat<br />
power and the Soviet inability to re-supply its forward units.</p>
<p>By early December, attacks south of Belyi by the newly arrived German reserves<br />
(19th and 20th Panzer Divisions) collapsed the Russian positions, and in conjunction with<br />
attacks around Belyi by the 1st and 12th Panzer Divisions and the Fusilier Regiment of the<br />
Grossdeutschland Division cut off and encircled the remnants of the Soviet 41st Army.<br />
Overnight on December 15th, the 41st Army destroyed its remaining heavy equipment and<br />
broke out of their encirclement on foot, reaching friendly lines by dawn.29</p>
<p><strong>SITUATION ON THE NORTHERN FLANK</strong></p>
<p>The attack of the 39th Army on the .nose. of the Rzhev salient in the vicinity of<br />
the village of Molodoi-Tud bore similar results to the attack on the Vazusa sector. Poor<br />
visibility limited the effectiveness of Soviet artillery fire on the dispersed German<br />
strongpoints. The initial assault came at a very heavy price and was generally repulsed<br />
across the front. Having been assured by Zhukov and Purkaev that his mission was to tie<br />
down as many German forces and reserves as possible, Major General A.I. Zygin,<br />
commander of the 31st Army reformed his forces and attacked again on the morning of<br />
November 26th. This time the skies had cleared and allowed for precision adjustment of<br />
artillery fires against the German strongpoints. One brigade broke through the German<br />
lines and was met by two battalions from the Grossdeutschland Motorized Division’s<br />
Grenadier Regiment along with elements of the 14th Motorized Division that had just<br />
arrived on scene. As soon as the breakthrough was contained and the Soviet advance<br />
blunted, those two battalions from the Grenadier Regiment were whisked south to stem<br />
the 22nd Army’s advance up the Luchesa River valley. Along the northern flank, Zygin’s<br />
forces continued to pound away at the German defenses and the situation quickly<br />
degenerated into a stalemate.</p>
<p><strong>OPERATION MARS: CONCLUSION</strong></p>
<p>Zhukov had been unable to achieve the dramatic results that he had envisioned for<br />
Operation MARS. In fact, given his strategic goals the results from Operation MARS<br />
were nothing short of disastrous. Losses had been monumental. Some 667,000 men and<br />
1900 tanks were committed to the initial assault on the Rzhev salient, and some 150,000<br />
men and hundreds of additional tanks from the Stavka reserve reinforced the attacking<br />
armies.30 Soviet records tried to hide the casualties suffered in the Rzhev fighting, and<br />
German estimates vary. German sources estimate that the Soviets lost between 150,000<br />
and 200,000 men and between 1655 and 1847 of the approximately 2000 tanks<br />
committed to the battle.31 Utilizing recently declassified Soviet archival materials,<br />
historian David Glantz estimates that Zhukov lost about 100,000 men killed and 235,000<br />
wounded during Operation MARS.32</p>
<p>To understand why Vasilevsky’s offensive succeeded so greatly and Zhukov’s<br />
failed so miserably one only needs to compare the situations of the forces attacked. In<br />
the south, the Germans were engaged in an extended offensive operation. Paulus’ Sixth<br />
Army was engaged in a war of attrition in and around Stalingrad and this battle drew<br />
Hitler’s attention. The Führer was closely involved in every aspect of the battle in and<br />
around Stalingrad. He micromanaged both the operational and tactical details of the<br />
campaign and became so mired in events that he directed almost every available man into<br />
the meat grinder in the city battle. While he did this to the detriment of Paulus’ Sixth<br />
Army and Army Groups A and B, it may have been to the benefit of Army Group Center.<br />
Preoccupied as he was with the situation in the south, he did not have time to be overly<br />
involved in the details of the situation in the Rzhev salient. Two days before MARS was<br />
launched, Hitler was deciding to supply the encircled Sixth Army via an air bridge. The<br />
day before MARS was launched, Manstein took command of the new Army Group Don<br />
and the efforts to break through the Russian cordon and relieve the Sixth Army.33 In<br />
addition to the situation around Stalingrad, Hitler had to deal with Rommel’s withdrawal<br />
towards Libya and the Allied TORCH landings in North Africa. As if that wasn’t enough<br />
to distract him, he also had the Italians urging him to seek a separate peace with the<br />
Soviets in order to concentrate on the war in the Mediterranean.34</p>
<p>The absence of Hitler’s meddling in the defense of the Soviet assault on the<br />
Rzhev salient is only part of the reason von Kluge was able to fend of Zhukov’s attacks.<br />
The situation of Army Group Center and Ninth Army was vastly different from the<br />
situation facing the 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies. Model’s Ninth Army had been on the<br />
defensive all of 1942, and had repelled the Soviet assault around Pogoreloe – Gorodische<br />
in August. These troops were in established defensive positions, were accustomed to<br />
recent and frequent Soviet attacks, and generally were better supplied, better trained, and<br />
had higher morale. The Pogoreloe – Gorodische attack allowed them to improve their<br />
defensive positions, obstacle plans, and prepare for a coming assault. Even without<br />
German intelligence reports about the pending offensive, the front line troops could see<br />
Soviet preparations, experience increased Soviet reconnaissance-in-force missions, and<br />
could discern when Soviet artillery harassment and interdiction fires switched over to<br />
registration fires.35</p>
<p>One interesting note about the battle was how German soldiers were able to<br />
destroy so many Soviet tanks when they lacked large numbers of large caliber or high<br />
velocity anti-tank weapons. At one point in the battles up the Luchesa River valley early<br />
on November 29th, a German 50mm anti-tank battalion engaged Soviet T-34 and KV-1<br />
tanks at close range, but the shells merely bounced off the Soviet tanks and the position<br />
was quickly overrun.36 This assault was finally halted with a German 88mm anti-aircraft<br />
battery destroyed 15 tanks by using their guns in direct fire mode.37 Still, the majority of<br />
the Soviet tanks did not fall victim to the German 88s. Many were destroyed by infantry<br />
teams employing explosive satchel charges and grenade bundles at extremely close<br />
range.38 Still others fell victim to icy roads, anti-tank mines, and of course, German<br />
panzers. It is also worth pointing out that many Soviet tanks were lost due to a lack of<br />
logistical support, in that they either ran out of fuel or broke down in the attack and were<br />
not able to be put back into action. Finally, many Soviet tanks were destroyed by their<br />
own crews when the 6th Tank Corps tried to break out from encirclement east of the<br />
Rzhev-Sychevka road. The 41st Army also destroyed all of their surviving vehicles when<br />
they broke out of encirclement south of Belyi on December 15th. Of course, German<br />
artillery and airpower accounted for Soviet armor losses as well.</p>
<p>Another significant difference between the German situation in the Rzhev salient<br />
and the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies in the south is that von Kluge had reserves available<br />
and had taken the time to clear internal lines of communications so that his Panzer<br />
Divisions and the motorized units of the Grossdeutschland Division could move about<br />
quickly to threatened areas. Even when units were stretched thin trying to man frontages<br />
too large for their units, commanders still formed mobile reserve units to plug gaps<br />
around their strongpoints. As a counterpoint, the Romanian forces protecting the flanks<br />
of Sixth Army were largely left on their own, with any available weapons, ammunition,<br />
troops and resources being redirected to battle of attrition in the streets of Stalingrad.</p>
<p>Command and control also played an integral role. On the evening of the Soviet<br />
attack on the Rzhev salient, Model and von Kluge were prepared and anticipating the<br />
assault. On November 24th both Army Group Center and Ninth Army released their<br />
reserves, and Model ordered counter-battery fire on known and suspected Soviet artillery<br />
positions, as well as suspected troop assembly areas and roads.39 Ninth Army also issued<br />
a warning order to all of its subordinate units placing them on full alert from 0400 to full<br />
daylight on November 25th and 26th. So obviously, the Germans knew the attack was<br />
coming and were as prepared as they could be. We should also consider command<br />
decisions made during the battle. The typical German commanders’ response was to hold<br />
positions in strongpoint and then form combined arms combat groups (kampfgruppe)<br />
with local commanders clearly designated. They then allowed them the freedom of<br />
action necessary to counterattack Soviet penetrations. For example, in the battles around<br />
Nikonovo and Gredianko on the Vazusa front, southwest of Rzhev, General Metz (5th<br />
Panzer Division Commander) made the decision to withdraw his forces from the<br />
strongpoint at Nikonovo – the site of heavy and costly fighting. He requested permission<br />
from XXXIX Panzer Corps headquarters to withdraw, and when a response did not<br />
immediately return he assumed that Corps headquarters was contacting Fürher<br />
headquarters to get permission. Knowing what the answer was liable to be, Metz<br />
executed the withdrawal on his own authority.40 Paulus and his generals, on the other<br />
hand, seemed more concerned with not disobeying Hitler than with doing what was<br />
necessary to protect their own forces.</p>
<p>In comparison, Soviet commanders from Zhukov on down seemed almost<br />
desperate to outshine the success of Vasilevsky’s forces. The 20th Army tried to cram too<br />
many units through the Vazusa bridgehead too quickly rather than methodically<br />
expanding the shoulders of the penetration before launching the exploitation force. The<br />
resulting traffic jams crippled the momentum of the assault and resulted in units being<br />
committed to combat in piecemeal fashion. Once the battle was joined and Zhukov had a<br />
picture of where his forces were successful and where they weren’t, he continued to order<br />
attacks across the entire frontage of the salient. To the Germans it seemed that Zhukov’s<br />
attacks on the morning of November 26th dissipated much of the Soviet’s combat power<br />
to where it couldn’t be used effectively in key spots.41</p>
<p>In many contemporary Soviet reports and histories, Operation MARS was<br />
described as a diversionary attack to freeze German reserves in place so that they could<br />
not be sent to counter the Soviet offensive to encircle Stalingrad. A couple of points<br />
deserve further examination. While the initial date for MARS was in advance of the date<br />
for URANUS, its value as a diversion was accomplished even though the assault was not<br />
launched until six days after Vasilevsky’s attack. As described above, Ninth Army and<br />
Army Group Center’s intelligence forces clearly saw the Soviet build up and the threat to<br />
the forces in the Rzhev salient. The mere presence of such a large force, extensive<br />
reconnaissance-in-force missions, and concentration of artillery – not to mention the<br />
presence of Zhukov in command – was enough to freeze German reserves in place. If<br />
MARS was to be a diversion, then why did Zhukov commit so many forces to the attack?<br />
Why did he force 6th Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps through the Rzhev<br />
bridgehead so soon and so quickly? A diversion and the freezing of German reserves<br />
could have been accomplished without losing almost 50% of his main combat units. No,<br />
the evidence points to this attack as being a matter of personal pride for Zhukov. Not<br />
only did he want to outshine Vasilevsky, he wanted to complete the job he started in<br />
December 1941 – that is, the destruction of Army Group Center.</p>
<p>The outcome of Operation MARS was far reaching; in that the losses and failure<br />
suffered trying to collapse the Rzhev salient shifted the Soviet strategic focus to the south<br />
for most of 1943. It may also have fueled Zhukov to be even more impatient and ruthless<br />
in his execution of the rest of the war.</p>
<p>The follow up to Operation MARS on the German side was Operation BUFFALO<br />
(BUEFFEL), which directed the abandonment of the Rzhev and Demyansk salients in<br />
March 1943. Withdrawing from these positions shortened the German lines by some 230<br />
miles, but it was too little and too late since German losses in the winter of 1942-43 had<br />
been so great that even with this reduced frontage, divisions were still too weak to fully<br />
man them.42</p>
<p>Details on Operation MARS have only recently come to light with the<br />
declassification of Soviet archives over the last 10 years. It is said that history is written<br />
by the victors, and in this case, the Soviets apparently didn’t want to admit a major defeat<br />
that could have overshadowed the resounding victory of Vasilevsky’s forces in the<br />
Stalingrad campaign. The destruction and surrender of the Sixth Army was a huge<br />
propaganda victory for the Soviets and served as a rallying point throughout much of the<br />
next year. News of a major defeat at the same time would have clearly diminished the<br />
shine on Stalin and the Red Army. It is interesting to note, that even as recently at 2005<br />
there are articles in Russia and abroad that are attempting to maintain the idea that the<br />
Rzhev battles were a diversion. In the Journal of Slavic Military Studies published 1<br />
September 2005 there was an article refuting recent attempts to hide the magnitude of the<br />
Soviet defeat at Rzhev. The article notes that in an eight volume set of the history of the<br />
Great Patriotic War, no mention of the battles around Rzhev is included.43 As more<br />
Soviet documents and memoirs of lower ranking Soviet soldiers are published, we will<br />
learn more about the significance of the battles around Rzhev.</p>
<p></span></p>
<p><strong>NOTES<br />
</strong><br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">1 Gehard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New<br />
York, Cambridge University Press, 1994) 424-5.</span></p>
<p>2 David M. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in<br />
Operation Mars, 1942 (Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1999) 6.</p>
<p>3 Weinberg, 425-6.</p>
<p>4 Thomas B. Buell, Clifton R. Franks, John A. Hixson, David R. Mets, Bruce R.<br />
Pirnie, James F. Ramsone Jr., Thomas R. Stone, and Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor The<br />
West Point Military History Series: The Second World War; Europe and the<br />
Mediterranean (Singapore, Square One Publishers, 2002) 127.</p>
<p>5 Timothy A. Wray, Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian<br />
Front During World War II Prewar to March 1943, Research Survey No. 5 (Fort<br />
Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff<br />
College, 1986) Available from: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Wray/wray.asp#swcnd<br />
(Accessed November 7, 2008).</p>
<p>6 Ibid.</p>
<p>7 David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed; How the Red Army<br />
Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1995) 149.</p>
<p>8 Wray.</p>
<p>9 Glantz, 16.</p>
<p>10 Weinberg, 424.</p>
<p>11 Glantz and House, 131-2.</p>
<p>12 Ibid, 153.</p>
<p>13 Antony Beevor, Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege 1942-1943 (New York, Penguin<br />
Books, 1998) 240.</p>
<p>14 Glantz and House, 133.</p>
<p>15 Ibid, 134.</p>
<p>16 Glantz, 24.</p>
<p>17 Ibid, 25.</p>
<p>18 Ibid, 33-34.</p>
<p>19 Ibid, 45.</p>
<p>20 Ibid, 111.</p>
</div>
<div><span style="font-size: xx-small;">21 .Operation Mars November-December 1942.. The Eastern Front, Available<br />
from: http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/Battles/operationmars.htm Internet; accessed 7<br />
November 2008).</p>
<p>22 Wray.</p>
<p>23 Glantz, 87.</p>
<p>24 Ibid, 92.</p>
<p>25 Ibid, 108.</p>
<p>26 .Operation Mars November-December 1942.. The Eastern Front.</p>
<p>27 Ibid, 121-22.</p>
<p>28 Ibid, 125.</p>
<p>29 .Operation Mars November-December 1942.. The Eastern Front.</p>
<p>30 Glantz, 304.</p>
<p>31 Ibid.</p>
<p>32 Ibid, 308.</p>
<p>33 Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis, (New York: W.W. Norton &#38; Co,<br />
2000) 544.</p>
<p>34 Ibid, 546.</p>
<p>35 Glantz, 77.</p>
<p>36 Ibid, 148.</p>
<p>37 Ibid.</p>
<p>38 Ibid, 85.</p>
<p>39 Ibid, 73.</p>
<p>40 Ibid, 187.</p>
<p>41 Ibid, 99.</p>
<p>42 Wray.</p>
<p>43 Tat&#8217;iana Mikhailova .The Battle of Rzhev: Ideology Instead of Statistics., The<br />
Journal of Slavic Military Studies,18:3, (London, UK. Taylor &#38; Francis / Routledge,<br />
2005) 362. To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13518040590969758, available from:<br />
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518040590969758 Accessed 16 November 2008.</p>
<p><strong>MAP CREDITS</strong></p>
<p>Map 1 &#8211; David M. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic<br />
Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1999) 21.</p>
<p>Map 2 &#8211; David M. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic<br />
Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1999) 23.</p>
<p><strong>BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
</strong></p>
<p>Beevor, Antony. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege 1942-1943. New York, Penguin Books,<br />
1998.</p>
<p>Buell, Thomas B.; Franks, Clifton R.; Hixson, John A.; Mets, David R.; Pirnie, Bruce R.;<br />
Ramsone, Jr., James F.; Stone, Thomas R.; and Griess, Thomas E. The West Point<br />
Military History Series: The Second World War; Europe and the Mediterranean.<br />
Singapore: Square One Publishers, 2002.</p>
<p>Glantz, David M. Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation<br />
Mars, 1942. Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1999.</p>
<p>Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed; How the Red Army<br />
Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1995.</p>
<p>Kershaw, Ian. Hitler 1936-1945 Nemesis. New York, W.W. Norton &#38; Co., 2000.</p>
<p>Mikhailova, Tat&#8217;iana. .The Battle of Rzhev: Ideology Instead of Statistics.. The Journal<br />
of Slavic Military Studies,18:3,359 — 368 Article: DOI:<br />
10.1080/13518040590969758 Available from:<br />
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518040590969758 Accessed 16 November 2008.</p>
<p>Weinberg, Gehard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. New York:<br />
Cambridge University Press, 1994.</p>
<p>Wray, Timothy A. Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front<br />
During World War II Prewar to March 1943, Research Survey No. 5. Fort<br />
Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General<br />
Staff College, 1986. Available from: http://www-<br />
cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Wray/wray.asp#swcnd Internet; Accessed November 7,<br />
2008.</p>
<p>Unknown. .Operation Mars November-December 1942.. The Eastern Front, Available<br />
from: http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/Battles/operationmars.htm Internet;<br />
Accessed 7 November 2008.</p>
<p>© 2010 Michael Harbert</p>
<p></span></div>
<p>﻿</p>
]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<div><span style="font-size: small;">Operation MARS</span></div>
<div>By <strong>Michael Harbert<br />
</strong></div>
<div><span style="font-size: x-small;"> The German operational mindset at the beginning of the 1942 campaigning<br />
season was based on the belief that the Soviets were incapable of developing and<br />
implementing a major coherent offensive operation of a scale and depth that could<br />
threaten Wehrmacht operations beyond the local level.1 This belief was reinforced by the<br />
early successes of Operation BLAU in the south, where German advances were swift and<br />
Soviet positions were encircled in depth, but yielded only a fraction of the prisoners that<br />
similar actions yielded only a year earlier. In fact, the Soviets were fighting a new style<br />
of staged withdrawal defensive operations up until Stalin’s .Not One Step Back. order of<br />
late 28 July 1942 (Order 227).2 The resulting drive toward the Volga and into the<br />
Caucuses consumed much of the Wehrmacht’s focus and offensive power.</p>
<p>The Soviet operational mindset in 1942 was focused initially on the defense of<br />
Moscow. Their December 1941 counter-offensives had left the front west of Moscow<br />
jagged and irregular, with the Germans still firmly lodged in a large salient in the region<br />
around Belyi, Rzhev, Sychevka and Viaz’ma and a smaller salient around Demyansk,<br />
both of which were seen as potential launching points for a renewed offensive aimed at<br />
Moscow (see Map 1). As a result, Soviet forces and reserves were concentrated to meet<br />
and renewed German thrust toward the Soviet capital. It was this concentration of<br />
German forces – the Ninth Army – that was to preoccupy the mind of Soviet Marshal<br />
Georgy Zhukov.</p>
<p>Zhukov had a personal stake in the fate of the Ninth Army and Army Group<br />
Center. He had engineered the 1941 winter offensive directed against Army Group<br />
Center that saved Moscow. While this was the first successful offensive of the war for</p>
<p><img src="http://www.writersofhistory.com/uploadfiles/mars_map.png" alt="" width="529" height="952" /><br />
Map 1- Situation on the Eastern Front when planning for Operations MARS and URANUS</p>
<p>(Map from David M. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat,</p>
<p>the Soviets, it fell short of Zhukov’s goal: the destruction of Army Group Center. He had<br />
planned large and while he was successful at ending the immediate threat to Moscow, he<br />
fell short of his own lofty goals. As a result, became fixated on completing the<br />
destruction of Army Group Center.</p>
<p><strong>SITUATION ACROSS THE FRONT </strong></p>
<p>German operations in the summer of 1942 were focused on Operation BLUE<br />
(BLAU) in the south. Hitler’s drive toward Stalingrad and into the Caucuses took<br />
priority for men, munitions, materiel, and equipment – and it met with a rousing success<br />
at first. But it was not the only offensive operation for the Wehrmacht on the eastern<br />
front.</p>
<p>After the fall of the Crimea, Hitler had more ambitions plans than just the<br />
launching of a major offensive in the south. Manstein’s 11th Army and the Sevastopol<br />
siege forces were ordered north to add their weight to the siege of Leningrad in Operation<br />
NORTHERN LIGHT. Any hope of future German operations in the north depended<br />
upon the fall of Leningrad and this operation was to be conducted despite the demand for<br />
additional forces in the south. Hitler’s grand ambitions were derailed as soon as the 11th<br />
Army arrived in the north, because the Volkhov front of General Meretskov launched an<br />
assault to relieve the besieged Soviet forces in Leningrad in late August. Meretskov’s<br />
initial successes were so great that those forces from the Crimea allocated for<br />
NORTHERN LIGHT were immediately committed to combat to stop Meretskov’s<br />
advance as soon as they arrived in theater. By the end of September, the Volkhov front’s<br />
offensive was stopped, but the offensive power of the reinforced Army Group North was<br />
also spent.3</p>
<p>In Army Group Center’s area of operations, only limited offensives were<br />
conducted in early 1942, usually with the intent of straightening defensive lines or<br />
increasing the security of their positions. The largest operation launched by Army Group<br />
Center was to widen and secure the corridor that reached out to the Demyansk pocket.<br />
Hitler had refused to allow evacuation of this tenuous position, so its link with the rest of<br />
Army Group Center had to be secured.</p>
<p>While Hitler had great plans for his southern offensive, the German Army was<br />
hardly in a position to conduct sustained offensive operations on a broad front. The<br />
demand for forces and supplies to fuel the offensive drained strength from across the<br />
front. In the spring of 1942, before the launch of BLAU, the infantry divisions of Army<br />
Group South were only at about 50% of their authorized strength. An OKW study<br />
released in May 1942 reported that the 225 divisions in Russia were collectively some<br />
625,000 men short of their authorized strength.4 In order to build up the divisions needed<br />
for Army Group South’s offensive, sixty-nine of the divisions of Army Groups North and<br />
Center were reduced in size from nine authorized battalions to six.5 While Hitler could<br />
have freed up German troops by authorizing his Army Group commanders to conduct<br />
local withdrawals to shorten and straighten their lines – including the abandonment of the<br />
Demyansk and Rzhev salients – he was fixated on never giving up conquered Soviet<br />
territory. So, as a result, as Sixth Army (now under Army Group A) advanced on<br />
Stalingrad, its extended flanks were turned over to the Axis allies, mainly Romanians.</p>
<p>Another step taken to fill the gaps needed for personnel on the eastern front was<br />
the creation of Luftwaffe field divisions. Tens of thousands of Luftwaffe personnel –<br />
men and officers – were organized as infantry units and committed to the front lines<br />
without appropriate infantry training. Inter-service rivalries and monumental egos<br />
prevented these men from being re-assigned and incorporated into infantry units where<br />
their effectiveness could have been assured. As it was, by summer and fall of 1942<br />
infantry replacements were undergoing a mere two months of training before arriving at<br />
the front.6 The result was that from Leningrad to the Caucuses, the German lines were<br />
stretched thin and undermanned. As it was, by the end of October 1942, German forces in<br />
the east were short some 300,000 replacements.7 Hitler’s .Operations Order 1. of 14<br />
October 1942 stressed a commitment to a linear defense in defensive zones across the<br />
entire front. He specifically shunned the .elastic defense. developed after 1916 and<br />
apparently envisioned World War I western front style trenches reaching across the entire<br />
front.8 The result was under strength units stretched thin, frequently ensconced in strong<br />
points simply out of necessity, and without adequate local reserves.</p>
<p><strong>SOVIET PLANS </strong></p>
<p>From early 1942, Stavka could not come to a consensus on where best to plan<br />
their pending offensives. Zhukov argued to strike at the German forces in the Rzhev<br />
salient, renewing the winter offensive and finishing the job of destroying Army Group<br />
Center. Colonel General Aleksandr Vasilevsky (Chief of the General Staff) and Marshal<br />
Boris Shaposhnikov argued for a strategic defensive across the entire front to allow the<br />
Germans to expend the bulk of their combat power before launching an offensive (a<br />
philosophy that was finally adopted a year later). Stalin finally agreed to the plan offered<br />
by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, to launch a limited pre-emptive offensive in the south<br />
against the German forces around Khar’kov.9</p>
<p>The Khar’kov offensive was soundly defeated and led to the launch the German<br />
offensive in the south. Zhukov, however, remained fixated on the Germans in the Rzhev<br />
salient, and in late July – while Paulus’ Sixth Army was driving on Stalingrad – he<br />
launched a limited offensive against Model’s Ninth Army in what became known as the<br />
Pogoreloe – Gorodische offensive. While this battle stretched into early September, it<br />
failed to achieve any significant goals. It did, however inflict severe casualties on Army<br />
Group Center, and gave Zhukov an indication of what a coordinated offensive across the<br />
entire salient could accomplish, but it came at a high price for the Soviets.</p>
<p>Throughout the spring and summer of 1942, the Soviets continued to build up<br />
reserve forces around Moscow at a rapid rate. Even though German intelligence saw this<br />
build up, they did not believe these forces capable of mounting a major offensive. In<br />
reality, the Soviets were not only planning a major offensive operation aimed at<br />
encircling a large portion of German forces in the south, they were actually planning two<br />
such operations. Zhukov and Vasilevsky began planning their winter offensives on 12<br />
September 1942.10 Although the details and timelines changed frequently, they<br />
envisioned launching two mutually supported major offensives &#8211; one in the south and one<br />
in central / western front. The amassing of Soviet reserves allowed them to realistically<br />
plan on such a grand scale. The overall plan called for Vasilevsky to lead the offensive in<br />
the south, Operation URANUS, aimed at the encirclement of the German Sixth Army in<br />
Stalingrad while Zhukov would lead the offensive against the Rzhev salient with the goal<br />
of encircling and destroying the German Ninth Army, Operation MARS. Both<br />
operations, if successful, were to be followed by even deeper encirclements designed for<br />
the destruction of German forces in the Caucuses (SATURN) and Army Group Center<br />
(JUPITER).</p>
<p>The concept behind combining Operations URANUS and MARS was to fix the<br />
German reserves in place where they would not be able to influence either battle.<br />
Initially, it was thought that both offensives would be launched simultaneously, forcing<br />
the Germans to either split their reserve forces or commit them to one area while almost<br />
assuring a resounding Soviet victory in the other sector. After several logistical and<br />
weather related delays, it was decided that Operation MARS would commence six days<br />
after URANUS was launched. The hope was that the Germans would dispatch their<br />
armored reserves toward the south, and before they could reach the battle they would<br />
have to be recalled to counter the advances threatening Army Group Center. In this<br />
manner, due to the distances involved, the reserves would not be able to have a<br />
significant impact on either battle.</p>
<p><strong>OPERATION URANUS </strong></p>
<p>The offensive plan of Operation URANUS is well known and thoroughly<br />
documented in histories of the war on the eastern front. Conceived and planned by both<br />
Zhukov and Vasilevsky – with many of the operational details left to Southwestern front<br />
commander Colonel General N.F. Vatutin, the operational plan called for a double<br />
envelopment deep in Sixth Army’s rear. The attack from the north was to be conducted<br />
Vatutin’s Southwestern front (5th Tank and 21st Armies) reinforced with the 65th Army<br />
from Rokossovsky’s Don front, while the attack from the south was to be conducted by<br />
elements of Colonel General A.I. Yeremenko’s Stalingrad front (51st and 57th Armies<br />
with 13th Tank and 4th Mechanized Corps) while the 62nd Army held Sixth Army’s<br />
attention in the city.11 It was to be a classic penetration by infantry and exploitation by<br />
armored and mechanized forces. The two pincers were to meet in the vicinity of the<br />
village of Kalach southwest of Stalingrad. Because the 5th Tank Army (Romanenko) of<br />
Vatutin’s northern pincer had about 30 kilometers further to travel to the proposed link up<br />
site, Yeremenko’s offensive was to be launched 24 hours later.</p>
<p>Based on Soviet intelligence reports and prisoner interrogations, it was decided<br />
that the URANUS assaults would be launched the 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies guarding<br />
the flanks of the German advance on Stalingrad. Under-equipped, without adequate anti-<br />
tank weapons, and suffering from poor morale, the Romanian forces were the ideal<br />
location to strike. Hitler’s paranoia and micromanagement had cowed his Army<br />
commanders to silent acquiescence, forcing them to focus internally rather than on the<br />
enemy situation. Those commanders who refused to be micromanaged or who objected<br />
too vociferously were relieved of their commands; Field Marshal Wilhelm List of Army<br />
Group A was relieved in September 1942.12 As a result, Hitler’s involvement in the<br />
tactical level of operations in the south prevented commanders from taking necessary<br />
defensive precautions, robbed them of initiative, and left them indecisive when the<br />
Soviets attacked.</p>
<p>The offensive in the south was launched on 19 November, with Yeremenko’s<br />
forces attacking on the 20th and met with immediate success. With overwhelming local<br />
superiority of forces and almost complete surprise, the Soviet breakthrough proceeded<br />
almost according to plan. The attack was opened with fires from some 3500 Soviet<br />
artillery and mortar tubes concentrated on a small front paved the way for twelve infantry<br />
divisions, three tank corps, and two cavalry corps.13 Without adequate anti-tank assets,<br />
the Romanians didn’t stand a chance. Although they were quickly condemned by their<br />
German counterparts, it wasn’t many days later when these same German units ran in the<br />
face of the advancing Soviet armor when they also lacked sufficient anti-tank weapons.<br />
Bypassing centers of resistance, the exploitation forces of the 5th Tank Army gained up to<br />
70 kilometers a day and netted over 27,000 prisoners.14 The situation developed so<br />
rapidly that the Germans were unable to react quickly enough to mount an effective<br />
counterattack or defensive. The pincers of the Southwestern front and the Stalingrad<br />
front linked up near Sovetskoe, just southeast of Kalach, completing the encirclement of<br />
the Axis forces in Stalingrad. By the end of November, the Soviets had trapped about<br />
330,000 German and Romanian soldiers from some 22 divisions in the Stalingrad area,<br />
including the Sixth Army, one corps of the 4th Panzer Army, and elements of both the 3rd<br />
and 4th Romanian Armies.15</p>
<p><strong>OPERATION MARS</strong></p>
<p>The attack against the Rzhev salient was to be conducted by the Western front of<br />
Colonel General I.S. Konev (20th, 30th, 31st, and 29th Armies) and the Kalinin front of<br />
Army General M.A. Purkaev (41st Army, 22nd Army, and 39th Army). Stavka allotted<br />
significant forces to this offensive, including 31 tank brigades, 12 tank regiments<br />
(totaling 2352 tanks); 54 artillery regiments, 30 Guards mortar battalions, and 23 anti-<br />
tank regiments (almost 10,000 guns and howitzers); and 20 separate engineer and sapper<br />
battalions.16 Zhukov took much more of a personal interest in the planning of Operation<br />
MARS, leaving many of the details of URANUS to Vasilevsky and Vatutin. The overall<br />
concept for MARS was similar in concept to URANUS. It involved pincer attacks<br />
launched by the 20th Army of Konev’s Western front across the Vazusa river north of<br />
Sychevka and the 22nd and 41st Armies of Purkaev’s Kalinin front across the shoulders of<br />
the salient, with a goal of penetrating the German lines and linking up to complete the<br />
encirclement of the Ninth Army (See Map 2). Supporting attacks would be launched by<br />
the 39th Army of Purkaev’s front on the northern .nose. of the salient and the 30th Army<br />
of Konev’s front west of Rzhev. Once the two pincers linked up, they would turn north<br />
to destroy the Ninth Army.</p>
<p>Zhukov’s plan was basically a series of simultaneous frontal assaults across the<br />
entire Rzhev salient. The main effort centered on the 20th Army attacking from the east<br />
across the Vazusa River north of Sychevka and the 41st Army attacking from the west,<br />
south of Belyi. The 22nd Army’s attack up the Luchesa River valley was designed to cut<br />
the main road linking the German defenders in Belyi with potential reinforcements<br />
coming from Olenino to the northeast. The attacks of the 30th and 39th Armies were<br />
primarily to fix German reserves in place and pressure all German forces in order to<br />
prevent them from helping counter the main thrusts. An assault was also launched by the<br />
3rd Shock Army of the Kalinin front against the German positions at Velikie Luki, some<br />
100 kilometers west of the attacks on Belyi and the Luchesa River valley. Originally,<br />
Stavka planned the MARS attack for 12 October, but bad weather and poor roads delayed<br />
preparations.17</p>
<p><img src="http://www.writersofhistory.com/uploadfiles/mars_map2.png" alt="" width="537" height="308" /></p>
<p>Map 2 – The Rzhev salient and scheme of maneuver for Operation MARS</p>
<p>German intelligence was aware of the Soviet build up and pending offensive.<br />
Basically, Ninth Army and Army Group Center knew that a major offensive was coming<br />
against the Rzhev salient, but they did not know exactly where or when.18 Even though<br />
Soviet deception operations and communications discipline had greatly improved through<br />
the summer of 1942, it was impossible to disguise all of the signs of a major troop build<br />
up. Field Marshal Guenther von Kluge, commander of Army Group Center, was<br />
perplexed and disturbed by the situation forming on the eastern front, especially after the<br />
launch of the Soviet offensive in the south. Throughout the spring of 1942, he had seen<br />
the build up of Soviet forces opposite of his Army Group, and this had opened the door<br />
for the German offensive in the south. Throughout the summer, he had continued to read<br />
intelligence reports that indicated that Soviet forces continued to build up in his region.<br />
Once Operation URANUS was launched, he resisted OKH’s suggestions that he release<br />
or shift his reserve forces to the south because he believed that the Soviet attack there was<br />
a secondary attack or diversion because intelligence showed that Zhukov was not present<br />
there. Instead, Zhukov was commanding forces opposite Army Group Center, and von<br />
Kluge believed that the main effort would fall under Zhukov.19</p>
<p>Operation MARS was launched on 25 November, six days after URANUS was<br />
launched in the south. To the west, where the 41st Army under Major General G.F.<br />
Tarasov was to attack south of Belyi, confidence was running high. Soviet intelligence<br />
had determined that at least half of the lines south of Belyi were occupied by the 2nd<br />
Luftwaffe Field Division, which Tarasov referred to as .Army Group Center’s<br />
Romanians..20 On the opposite side of the salient, confidence was running high as well,<br />
but circumstances conspired to complicate the attack. Even though the assault fell upon<br />
the 5th Panzer Division while it was being relieved in place by the 78th Infantry Division<br />
along the Vazusa River, the German positions mostly held. Snow was falling at a rate of<br />
about one inch an hour with low hanging clouds, which limited observation necessary to<br />
adjust preplanned artillery fires and precluded the employment of Soviet air power. The<br />
result was that much of the massed Soviet preparatory fires were ineffective and many<br />
German defensive strong points were left unscathed.</p>
<p>The Ninth Army had anticipated a renewed Soviet attack ever since the August<br />
offensive around Pogoreloe – Gorodische had ended. General Walter Model, commander<br />
of the Ninth Army had not squandered the opportunity presented by the lull of September<br />
and October. During that time, not only were front line defensive positions improved and<br />
obstacles erected, but he also directed that forests be cleared from the edges of the main<br />
roads inside the salient. Trees were cut out to one to two kilometers from the edge of the<br />
road. This served two purposes; first, it cleared fields of fire for his panzer reserves, and<br />
second, it opened and improved his interior lines of communications and gave his mobile<br />
reserves room to maneuver.21 Also, as described above, Hitler’s .Operations Order 1. of<br />
October 1942 decreed that German forces were to employ a linear defense across the<br />
whole of the defensive front. While he expressly forbade employment of the .elastic<br />
defense. he expressly stressed that .… every Stützpunkt (strongpoint) was to be defended<br />
to the last..22 It appears that Model complied with the spirit of Hitler’s order, but not<br />
necessarily the letter. The defensive front of the Rzhev salient could generally be<br />
described as a series of strongpoints mostly connected by communications trenches.<br />
These strongpoints, usually in company or battalion size, were built around villages and<br />
stone houses. In the ensuing attack, many of these strongpoints survived the Soviet<br />
preplanned artillery fires and were bypassed by the lead echelons of the attack.
</p>
<p></span><span style="font-size: x-small;"><strong>SITUATION ON THE EASTERN FLANK OF THE SALIENT<br />
</strong><br />
The 20th Army’s assault across the frozen Vazusa River was lead by Soviet<br />
punishment battalions and sappers sent forward to clear mines and obstacles. In many<br />
cases, the soldiers of the punishment units advanced forward until they came under fire<br />
and then took to ground, halting the forward progress of the assault. Infantry from the<br />
main assault units arrived at the river just in time to be met by concentrated German<br />
artillery fire. Like most rivers in that part of Russia, the western banks of the Vazusa<br />
were higher than those of the eastern shore, which made for a more formidable defensive<br />
line. Soviet assault divisions were met by heavy fire and a determined German<br />
resistance. The result was heavy Soviet casualties and no penetrations. The only success<br />
by the Soviet 20th Army came in center of their attack zone. The narrow bridgehead and<br />
breakthrough was by mid-day the only opportunity for the cavalry-mechanized and tank<br />
exploitation forces advance into the German rear toward their primary objectives; the<br />
Rzhev-Sychevka railroad.</p>
<p>With the other beachheads across the Vazusa largely contained, Konev adjusted<br />
his original plan and shifted mechanized and armored forces to take advantage the<br />
establishment of this bridgehead. The Soviet 6th Tank Corps was to be the primary<br />
exploitation force. Konev ordered them to shift south, cross the Vazusa that night and<br />
assist the infantry divisions across the river in punching through the final German<br />
positions. Additional infantry was needed to support this breakthrough, so one division<br />
and two brigades of the 8th Guards Rifle Corps ordered forward to support this<br />
breakthrough, as were elements of General V.V. Kriukov’s 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps.<br />
These forces were to be followed by 1st Guards Motorized Rifle Division and the 31st<br />
Tank Brigade. The 251st Rifle Division was also directed to enter the bridgehead and<br />
expand the penetration to the north and west.23 The result, as can be imagined, was a<br />
considerable traffic jam. The roads leading to the bridgehead were limited and under a<br />
layer of fresh snow. Soviet communications were strained, and German artillery fire<br />
crashed down on suspected assembly areas. Konev’s handling of the situation reveals a<br />
desperate grasping for success, trying to send too many forces through too narrow a<br />
bridgehead in too short of a time.</p>
<p>Although elements of the 6th Tank Corps were able to break through into the<br />
German rear and even cut the Rzhev-Sychevka railroad, the required follow on infantry,<br />
mechanized, and logistical forces were unable to follow. When the German reserves in<br />
the area, the 9th Panzer Division, moved in to block the Rzhev-Sychevka railroad, the<br />
elements of the 6th Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps that had crossed the<br />
railroad were cut off. Owing to the small size of the Vazusa bridgehead and the confused<br />
congestion of units trying to cross the river, the Soviet artillery had been unable to<br />
displace across the river. The result was the much of the 6th Tank Corps was out of range<br />
of the supporting artillery. By the end of the day on November 26th, the 6th Tank Corps<br />
had lost approximately 50% of its tanks and men, and most of its fuel and ammunition.24</p>
<p>The German defensive line on the shoulders of the Vazusa bridgehead held fast<br />
for several days centered on strongpoints in the villages of Nikonova and Gredianko.<br />
The Soviets paid an extremely heavy price trying to take these villages, and eventually<br />
expended the bulk of their offensive combat power taking them. Wherever the Soviets<br />
were able to take a German strongpoint, a quick local counterattack frequently took the<br />
village back. The result was that no matter how far Soviet armor penetrated, German<br />
strongpoints continued to operate in their rear, preventing the movement of infantry and<br />
necessary logistics.</p>
<p>Confusion at the Vazusa bridgehead disrupted the assault plan, prevented the<br />
displacement and effective employment of Soviet artillery, and kept needed logistical<br />
support from getting to the units that needed it. The result was that the 6th Tank Corps sat<br />
immobile awaiting relief while the Germans assembled combat groups (Kampfgruppe)<br />
plug gaps and counterattack at key points. No matter where the Soviets advanced on the<br />
eastern face of the salient, the Germans were able to react effectively. They formed<br />
reserve units from .clerks and bottle washers. and whoever else was available.25 It was a<br />
close fought battle, but sound and timely decisions by the Germans (and a lack of the<br />
same on part of the Soviets) turned the tide in favor of the Wehrmacht. Across this<br />
section of the battle, the Soviets suffered huge casualties for very little gain. The assault<br />
lost momentum and eventually halted primarily due to Soviet units spending their combat<br />
power so rapidly.</p>
<p>The elements of the 6th Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps trapped<br />
west of the Rzhev-Sychevka road, low on fuel and ammunition, attempted a breakout<br />
back to the Vazusa bridgehead on the night of November 29th. In another close fought<br />
battle, they succeeded in breaking out and reaching Soviet positions in the bridgehead,<br />
but they lost almost all of their vehicles and heavy equipment and again suffered<br />
tremendous casualties.</p>
<p>In early December, the 22nd Army was reinforced by the 5th Tank Corps and<br />
elements of the Stavka reserve reinforced the 29th Army in order to renew the assault<br />
across the Vazusa. On 11 December, in a desperate gamble to try and salvage some<br />
success for Operation MARS, especially in the shadow of the rousing victory of<br />
Vasilevsky’s forces to the south, Zhukov renewed the assault against the recently<br />
reinforce German positions. The result was four more days of costly close quarters<br />
combat. By the end of the day on December 12th, 20th Army had lost an additional 200<br />
tanks to the German anti-tank defenses. The 5th Tank Corps was committed to the fight<br />
that same day, and by December 15th it too was spent.26</p>
<p></span><span style="font-size: x-small;"><strong>SITUATION ON THE WESTERN FLANK OF THE SALIENT<br />
</strong><br />
The primary focus of the assault on the western flank of the salient was Major<br />
General G.F. Tarasov’s 41st Army’s attack south of Belyi. Attacking mainly against the<br />
2nd Luftwaffe Field Division, his army made significant gains on the first day. Snow was<br />
not falling so visibility was considerably better than in 20th Army’s zone on the Vazusa.<br />
The result was that the artillery preparation fires were much more effective, and the<br />
advance rolled through two Luftwaffe regiments and a regiment of the 246th Infantry<br />
Division. The primary objective of the 41st Army’s assault forces was to reach the Nacha<br />
River and cut the roads leading southeast from Belyi. The Soviet belief was that if they<br />
could cut these roads that reinforcements could not reach the Germans at Belyi and the<br />
position would fall.</p>
<p>Colonel General Joseph Harpe, commander of the XXXXI Panzer Corps<br />
defending in that sector, saw Belyi as the key to holding the Rzhev salient. So he decided<br />
to focus primarily on holding Belyi and placing blocking positions along the Nacha River<br />
to prevent the Soviets from using it as an approach on the rear of his forces. Utilizing his<br />
reserves, mainly the Grossdeutschland Motorized Rifle Division and the 1st Panzer<br />
Division, Harpe developed kampfgruppes to establish blocking positions and to launch<br />
counterattacks to regain lost German positions. Again the German defenses were<br />
anchored on a series of strongpoints built on villages. Fighting was generally conducted<br />
at close range, which removed many of the advantages of the Soviet armor. Many Soviet<br />
tanks were lost to anti-tank mines and German infantry using explosives and grenade<br />
bundles.27 General Harpe’s battle involved rushing his limited reserves from one critical<br />
battle to another, trying desperately to hold on until Army Group Center’s reserves, the<br />
XXX Corps could arrive. By the end of the day on November 26th, the Soviets had<br />
penetrated on a front 15-20 kilometers wide and 30-40 kilometers deep in the area south<br />
of Belyi.28 Harpe’s forces were able to hold on by knowing where to ignore Soviet<br />
advances and where to concentrate their defenses and local counterattacks.</p>
<p>The Soviet’s other attempt to cut off the Germans in Belyi came in the 22nd<br />
Army’s thrust up the Luchesa River valley north of Belyi. The terrain in the valley<br />
canalized the Soviet assault and limited their ability to maneuver. It also allowed the<br />
limited German defenders to effectively employ minefields and conduct close range<br />
infantry ambushes. This style of close forest fighting consumed fuel and ammunition at<br />
an alarming rate, and bypassed German troops further hindered Soviet re-supply efforts.<br />
Even so, it was a very closely fought battle until the arrival of reserves from the<br />
Grossdeutschland Motorized Division’s Grenadier Regiment, which had to split its forces<br />
between fending off Soviet advances up the Luchesa River valley and in the north near<br />
the village of Molodoi-Tud. The Soviet advances both north and south of Belyi gained<br />
significant territory, but failed to cut off or destroy the German positions in and around<br />
Belyi and came at a very heavy price. Like the attacks across the Vazusa River, the<br />
Soviet forces involved in the key attacks around Belyi and on the Nacha River suffered<br />
around fifty-percent losses and the attacks ran out of steam due to expenditure of combat<br />
power and the Soviet inability to re-supply its forward units.</p>
<p>By early December, attacks south of Belyi by the newly arrived German reserves<br />
(19th and 20th Panzer Divisions) collapsed the Russian positions, and in conjunction with<br />
attacks around Belyi by the 1st and 12th Panzer Divisions and the Fusilier Regiment of the<br />
Grossdeutschland Division cut off and encircled the remnants of the Soviet 41st Army.<br />
Overnight on December 15th, the 41st Army destroyed its remaining heavy equipment and<br />
broke out of their encirclement on foot, reaching friendly lines by dawn.29</p>
<p><strong>SITUATION ON THE NORTHERN FLANK</strong></p>
<p>The attack of the 39th Army on the .nose. of the Rzhev salient in the vicinity of<br />
the village of Molodoi-Tud bore similar results to the attack on the Vazusa sector. Poor<br />
visibility limited the effectiveness of Soviet artillery fire on the dispersed German<br />
strongpoints. The initial assault came at a very heavy price and was generally repulsed<br />
across the front. Having been assured by Zhukov and Purkaev that his mission was to tie<br />
down as many German forces and reserves as possible, Major General A.I. Zygin,<br />
commander of the 31st Army reformed his forces and attacked again on the morning of<br />
November 26th. This time the skies had cleared and allowed for precision adjustment of<br />
artillery fires against the German strongpoints. One brigade broke through the German<br />
lines and was met by two battalions from the Grossdeutschland Motorized Division’s<br />
Grenadier Regiment along with elements of the 14th Motorized Division that had just<br />
arrived on scene. As soon as the breakthrough was contained and the Soviet advance<br />
blunted, those two battalions from the Grenadier Regiment were whisked south to stem<br />
the 22nd Army’s advance up the Luchesa River valley. Along the northern flank, Zygin’s<br />
forces continued to pound away at the German defenses and the situation quickly<br />
degenerated into a stalemate.</p>
<p><strong>OPERATION MARS: CONCLUSION</strong></p>
<p>Zhukov had been unable to achieve the dramatic results that he had envisioned for<br />
Operation MARS. In fact, given his strategic goals the results from Operation MARS<br />
were nothing short of disastrous. Losses had been monumental. Some 667,000 men and<br />
1900 tanks were committed to the initial assault on the Rzhev salient, and some 150,000<br />
men and hundreds of additional tanks from the Stavka reserve reinforced the attacking<br />
armies.30 Soviet records tried to hide the casualties suffered in the Rzhev fighting, and<br />
German estimates vary. German sources estimate that the Soviets lost between 150,000<br />
and 200,000 men and between 1655 and 1847 of the approximately 2000 tanks<br />
committed to the battle.31 Utilizing recently declassified Soviet archival materials,<br />
historian David Glantz estimates that Zhukov lost about 100,000 men killed and 235,000<br />
wounded during Operation MARS.32</p>
<p>To understand why Vasilevsky’s offensive succeeded so greatly and Zhukov’s<br />
failed so miserably one only needs to compare the situations of the forces attacked. In<br />
the south, the Germans were engaged in an extended offensive operation. Paulus’ Sixth<br />
Army was engaged in a war of attrition in and around Stalingrad and this battle drew<br />
Hitler’s attention. The Führer was closely involved in every aspect of the battle in and<br />
around Stalingrad. He micromanaged both the operational and tactical details of the<br />
campaign and became so mired in events that he directed almost every available man into<br />
the meat grinder in the city battle. While he did this to the detriment of Paulus’ Sixth<br />
Army and Army Groups A and B, it may have been to the benefit of Army Group Center.<br />
Preoccupied as he was with the situation in the south, he did not have time to be overly<br />
involved in the details of the situation in the Rzhev salient. Two days before MARS was<br />
launched, Hitler was deciding to supply the encircled Sixth Army via an air bridge. The<br />
day before MARS was launched, Manstein took command of the new Army Group Don<br />
and the efforts to break through the Russian cordon and relieve the Sixth Army.33 In<br />
addition to the situation around Stalingrad, Hitler had to deal with Rommel’s withdrawal<br />
towards Libya and the Allied TORCH landings in North Africa. As if that wasn’t enough<br />
to distract him, he also had the Italians urging him to seek a separate peace with the<br />
Soviets in order to concentrate on the war in the Mediterranean.34</p>
<p>The absence of Hitler’s meddling in the defense of the Soviet assault on the<br />
Rzhev salient is only part of the reason von Kluge was able to fend of Zhukov’s attacks.<br />
The situation of Army Group Center and Ninth Army was vastly different from the<br />
situation facing the 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies. Model’s Ninth Army had been on the<br />
defensive all of 1942, and had repelled the Soviet assault around Pogoreloe – Gorodische<br />
in August. These troops were in established defensive positions, were accustomed to<br />
recent and frequent Soviet attacks, and generally were better supplied, better trained, and<br />
had higher morale. The Pogoreloe – Gorodische attack allowed them to improve their<br />
defensive positions, obstacle plans, and prepare for a coming assault. Even without<br />
German intelligence reports about the pending offensive, the front line troops could see<br />
Soviet preparations, experience increased Soviet reconnaissance-in-force missions, and<br />
could discern when Soviet artillery harassment and interdiction fires switched over to<br />
registration fires.35</p>
<p>One interesting note about the battle was how German soldiers were able to<br />
destroy so many Soviet tanks when they lacked large numbers of large caliber or high<br />
velocity anti-tank weapons. At one point in the battles up the Luchesa River valley early<br />
on November 29th, a German 50mm anti-tank battalion engaged Soviet T-34 and KV-1<br />
tanks at close range, but the shells merely bounced off the Soviet tanks and the position<br />
was quickly overrun.36 This assault was finally halted with a German 88mm anti-aircraft<br />
battery destroyed 15 tanks by using their guns in direct fire mode.37 Still, the majority of<br />
the Soviet tanks did not fall victim to the German 88s. Many were destroyed by infantry<br />
teams employing explosive satchel charges and grenade bundles at extremely close<br />
range.38 Still others fell victim to icy roads, anti-tank mines, and of course, German<br />
panzers. It is also worth pointing out that many Soviet tanks were lost due to a lack of<br />
logistical support, in that they either ran out of fuel or broke down in the attack and were<br />
not able to be put back into action. Finally, many Soviet tanks were destroyed by their<br />
own crews when the 6th Tank Corps tried to break out from encirclement east of the<br />
Rzhev-Sychevka road. The 41st Army also destroyed all of their surviving vehicles when<br />
they broke out of encirclement south of Belyi on December 15th. Of course, German<br />
artillery and airpower accounted for Soviet armor losses as well.</p>
<p>Another significant difference between the German situation in the Rzhev salient<br />
and the Romanian 3rd and 4th Armies in the south is that von Kluge had reserves available<br />
and had taken the time to clear internal lines of communications so that his Panzer<br />
Divisions and the motorized units of the Grossdeutschland Division could move about<br />
quickly to threatened areas. Even when units were stretched thin trying to man frontages<br />
too large for their units, commanders still formed mobile reserve units to plug gaps<br />
around their strongpoints. As a counterpoint, the Romanian forces protecting the flanks<br />
of Sixth Army were largely left on their own, with any available weapons, ammunition,<br />
troops and resources being redirected to battle of attrition in the streets of Stalingrad.</p>
<p>Command and control also played an integral role. On the evening of the Soviet<br />
attack on the Rzhev salient, Model and von Kluge were prepared and anticipating the<br />
assault. On November 24th both Army Group Center and Ninth Army released their<br />
reserves, and Model ordered counter-battery fire on known and suspected Soviet artillery<br />
positions, as well as suspected troop assembly areas and roads.39 Ninth Army also issued<br />
a warning order to all of its subordinate units placing them on full alert from 0400 to full<br />
daylight on November 25th and 26th. So obviously, the Germans knew the attack was<br />
coming and were as prepared as they could be. We should also consider command<br />
decisions made during the battle. The typical German commanders’ response was to hold<br />
positions in strongpoint and then form combined arms combat groups (kampfgruppe)<br />
with local commanders clearly designated. They then allowed them the freedom of<br />
action necessary to counterattack Soviet penetrations. For example, in the battles around<br />
Nikonovo and Gredianko on the Vazusa front, southwest of Rzhev, General Metz (5th<br />
Panzer Division Commander) made the decision to withdraw his forces from the<br />
strongpoint at Nikonovo – the site of heavy and costly fighting. He requested permission<br />
from XXXIX Panzer Corps headquarters to withdraw, and when a response did not<br />
immediately return he assumed that Corps headquarters was contacting Fürher<br />
headquarters to get permission. Knowing what the answer was liable to be, Metz<br />
executed the withdrawal on his own authority.40 Paulus and his generals, on the other<br />
hand, seemed more concerned with not disobeying Hitler than with doing what was<br />
necessary to protect their own forces.</p>
<p>In comparison, Soviet commanders from Zhukov on down seemed almost<br />
desperate to outshine the success of Vasilevsky’s forces. The 20th Army tried to cram too<br />
many units through the Vazusa bridgehead too quickly rather than methodically<br />
expanding the shoulders of the penetration before launching the exploitation force. The<br />
resulting traffic jams crippled the momentum of the assault and resulted in units being<br />
committed to combat in piecemeal fashion. Once the battle was joined and Zhukov had a<br />
picture of where his forces were successful and where they weren’t, he continued to order<br />
attacks across the entire frontage of the salient. To the Germans it seemed that Zhukov’s<br />
attacks on the morning of November 26th dissipated much of the Soviet’s combat power<br />
to where it couldn’t be used effectively in key spots.41</p>
<p>In many contemporary Soviet reports and histories, Operation MARS was<br />
described as a diversionary attack to freeze German reserves in place so that they could<br />
not be sent to counter the Soviet offensive to encircle Stalingrad. A couple of points<br />
deserve further examination. While the initial date for MARS was in advance of the date<br />
for URANUS, its value as a diversion was accomplished even though the assault was not<br />
launched until six days after Vasilevsky’s attack. As described above, Ninth Army and<br />
Army Group Center’s intelligence forces clearly saw the Soviet build up and the threat to<br />
the forces in the Rzhev salient. The mere presence of such a large force, extensive<br />
reconnaissance-in-force missions, and concentration of artillery – not to mention the<br />
presence of Zhukov in command – was enough to freeze German reserves in place. If<br />
MARS was to be a diversion, then why did Zhukov commit so many forces to the attack?<br />
Why did he force 6th Tank Corps and the 2nd Guards Cavalry Corps through the Rzhev<br />
bridgehead so soon and so quickly? A diversion and the freezing of German reserves<br />
could have been accomplished without losing almost 50% of his main combat units. No,<br />
the evidence points to this attack as being a matter of personal pride for Zhukov. Not<br />
only did he want to outshine Vasilevsky, he wanted to complete the job he started in<br />
December 1941 – that is, the destruction of Army Group Center.</p>
<p>The outcome of Operation MARS was far reaching; in that the losses and failure<br />
suffered trying to collapse the Rzhev salient shifted the Soviet strategic focus to the south<br />
for most of 1943. It may also have fueled Zhukov to be even more impatient and ruthless<br />
in his execution of the rest of the war.</p>
<p>The follow up to Operation MARS on the German side was Operation BUFFALO<br />
(BUEFFEL), which directed the abandonment of the Rzhev and Demyansk salients in<br />
March 1943. Withdrawing from these positions shortened the German lines by some 230<br />
miles, but it was too little and too late since German losses in the winter of 1942-43 had<br />
been so great that even with this reduced frontage, divisions were still too weak to fully<br />
man them.42</p>
<p>Details on Operation MARS have only recently come to light with the<br />
declassification of Soviet archives over the last 10 years. It is said that history is written<br />
by the victors, and in this case, the Soviets apparently didn’t want to admit a major defeat<br />
that could have overshadowed the resounding victory of Vasilevsky’s forces in the<br />
Stalingrad campaign. The destruction and surrender of the Sixth Army was a huge<br />
propaganda victory for the Soviets and served as a rallying point throughout much of the<br />
next year. News of a major defeat at the same time would have clearly diminished the<br />
shine on Stalin and the Red Army. It is interesting to note, that even as recently at 2005<br />
there are articles in Russia and abroad that are attempting to maintain the idea that the<br />
Rzhev battles were a diversion. In the Journal of Slavic Military Studies published 1<br />
September 2005 there was an article refuting recent attempts to hide the magnitude of the<br />
Soviet defeat at Rzhev. The article notes that in an eight volume set of the history of the<br />
Great Patriotic War, no mention of the battles around Rzhev is included.43 As more<br />
Soviet documents and memoirs of lower ranking Soviet soldiers are published, we will<br />
learn more about the significance of the battles around Rzhev.</p>
<p></span></p>
<p><strong>NOTES<br />
</strong><br />
<span style="font-size: xx-small;">1 Gehard L. Weinberg, A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II (New<br />
York, Cambridge University Press, 1994) 424-5.</span></p>
<p>2 David M. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in<br />
Operation Mars, 1942 (Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1999) 6.</p>
<p>3 Weinberg, 425-6.</p>
<p>4 Thomas B. Buell, Clifton R. Franks, John A. Hixson, David R. Mets, Bruce R.<br />
Pirnie, James F. Ramsone Jr., Thomas R. Stone, and Thomas E. Griess, Series Editor The<br />
West Point Military History Series: The Second World War; Europe and the<br />
Mediterranean (Singapore, Square One Publishers, 2002) 127.</p>
<p>5 Timothy A. Wray, Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian<br />
Front During World War II Prewar to March 1943, Research Survey No. 5 (Fort<br />
Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff<br />
College, 1986) Available from: http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Wray/wray.asp#swcnd<br />
(Accessed November 7, 2008).</p>
<p>6 Ibid.</p>
<p>7 David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed; How the Red Army<br />
Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1995) 149.</p>
<p>8 Wray.</p>
<p>9 Glantz, 16.</p>
<p>10 Weinberg, 424.</p>
<p>11 Glantz and House, 131-2.</p>
<p>12 Ibid, 153.</p>
<p>13 Antony Beevor, Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege 1942-1943 (New York, Penguin<br />
Books, 1998) 240.</p>
<p>14 Glantz and House, 133.</p>
<p>15 Ibid, 134.</p>
<p>16 Glantz, 24.</p>
<p>17 Ibid, 25.</p>
<p>18 Ibid, 33-34.</p>
<p>19 Ibid, 45.</p>
<p>20 Ibid, 111.</p>
</div>
<div><span style="font-size: xx-small;">21 .Operation Mars November-December 1942.. The Eastern Front, Available<br />
from: http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/Battles/operationmars.htm Internet; accessed 7<br />
November 2008).</p>
<p>22 Wray.</p>
<p>23 Glantz, 87.</p>
<p>24 Ibid, 92.</p>
<p>25 Ibid, 108.</p>
<p>26 .Operation Mars November-December 1942.. The Eastern Front.</p>
<p>27 Ibid, 121-22.</p>
<p>28 Ibid, 125.</p>
<p>29 .Operation Mars November-December 1942.. The Eastern Front.</p>
<p>30 Glantz, 304.</p>
<p>31 Ibid.</p>
<p>32 Ibid, 308.</p>
<p>33 Ian Kershaw, Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis, (New York: W.W. Norton &amp; Co,<br />
2000) 544.</p>
<p>34 Ibid, 546.</p>
<p>35 Glantz, 77.</p>
<p>36 Ibid, 148.</p>
<p>37 Ibid.</p>
<p>38 Ibid, 85.</p>
<p>39 Ibid, 73.</p>
<p>40 Ibid, 187.</p>
<p>41 Ibid, 99.</p>
<p>42 Wray.</p>
<p>43 Tat&#8217;iana Mikhailova .The Battle of Rzhev: Ideology Instead of Statistics., The<br />
Journal of Slavic Military Studies,18:3, (London, UK. Taylor &amp; Francis / Routledge,<br />
2005) 362. To link to this Article: DOI: 10.1080/13518040590969758, available from:<br />
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518040590969758 Accessed 16 November 2008.</p>
<p><strong>MAP CREDITS</strong></p>
<p>Map 1 &#8211; David M. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic<br />
Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1999) 21.</p>
<p>Map 2 &#8211; David M. Glantz, Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic<br />
Disaster in Operation Mars, 1942 (Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1999) 23.</p>
<p><strong>BIBLIOGRAPHY<br />
</strong></p>
<p>Beevor, Antony. Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege 1942-1943. New York, Penguin Books,<br />
1998.</p>
<p>Buell, Thomas B.; Franks, Clifton R.; Hixson, John A.; Mets, David R.; Pirnie, Bruce R.;<br />
Ramsone, Jr., James F.; Stone, Thomas R.; and Griess, Thomas E. The West Point<br />
Military History Series: The Second World War; Europe and the Mediterranean.<br />
Singapore: Square One Publishers, 2002.</p>
<p>Glantz, David M. Zhukov’s Greatest Defeat: The Red Army’s Epic Disaster in Operation<br />
Mars, 1942. Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1999.</p>
<p>Glantz, David M. and House, Jonathan. When Titans Clashed; How the Red Army<br />
Stopped Hitler. Lawrence, KS, University Press of Kansas, 1995.</p>
<p>Kershaw, Ian. Hitler 1936-1945 Nemesis. New York, W.W. Norton &amp; Co., 2000.</p>
<p>Mikhailova, Tat&#8217;iana. .The Battle of Rzhev: Ideology Instead of Statistics.. The Journal<br />
of Slavic Military Studies,18:3,359 — 368 Article: DOI:<br />
10.1080/13518040590969758 Available from:<br />
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518040590969758 Accessed 16 November 2008.</p>
<p>Weinberg, Gehard L. A World at Arms: A Global History of World War II. New York:<br />
Cambridge University Press, 1994.</p>
<p>Wray, Timothy A. Standing Fast: German Defensive Doctrine on the Russian Front<br />
During World War II Prewar to March 1943, Research Survey No. 5. Fort<br />
Leavenworth, KS, Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General<br />
Staff College, 1986. Available from: http://www-<br />
cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/Wray/wray.asp#swcnd Internet; Accessed November 7,<br />
2008.</p>
<p>Unknown. .Operation Mars November-December 1942.. The Eastern Front, Available<br />
from: http://www.theeasternfront.co.uk/Battles/operationmars.htm Internet;<br />
Accessed 7 November 2008.</p>
<p>© 2010 Michael Harbert</p>
<p></span></div>
<p>﻿</p>
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